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INTRODUCTION 
Individuals endowed with superior intellect have long held society's interest, and what 
sets these individuals apart has been the subject of much research and theorizing (Dark & 
Benbow, 1993; Gardner, 1983; Lohman, 1989; Sternberg, 1993; Storfer, 1990). Inquiries 
about superior intellect naturally lead to inquiries about the nature of human intelligence 
(Howe, 1990). What features define intelligent thinkmg? What are the haUmarks of 
intelligent behavior? It has been widely quoted in the literature that intelligence is what 
intelligence tests measure (Weinberg, 1989). Contrary to this circular definition, however, 
intelligence goes beyond what intelligence tests measure. Indeed, the basis of the triarchic 
theory of intelligence (Sternberg, 1984,1985a, 1985b, 1986,1987,1988a, 1991a, 1991b) is 
the contention that a theory of intelligence should encompass more than what existing aptitude 
and achievement tests measure. 
Automatization and Response to Novelty 
Incorporated in the triarchic theory of intelligence is a two-facet subtheory that 
proposes that the abilities to automatize thinking processes and to think through novel 
problems are integral components of intelligence (Sternberg, 1985a). These abilities are 
thought to be related; If some requisite thinking processes are already automatized, then more 
memory resources can be allocated to processing the novel aspects of a problem. Conversely, 
efficiency in dealing with the problem's novel aspects can expedite automatization of whatever 
thinking processes these aspects tap (Glaser, 1991; Sternberg, 1988a). 
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Quantitative Differences Between Intellectualfy Gifted and Average-ability Individuab 
In their review of cognitive differences among the gifted. Dark and Benbow (1993) 
concluded that ability differences between gifted and average-ability individuals are 
quantitative in nature (See also Jackson & Butterfield, 1986). Dark and Benbow (1993) 
noted that this conclusion has been borne out by research that used both psychometric and 
cognitive approaches to the study of intelligence. Through the psychometric approach, factor 
structures of intelligence were constructed using aptitude and achievement test scores from a 
general population (Verster, 1987). These factor structures were found to adequately explain 
test performance even in a more restricted gifted population (Benbow, Stanley, Zonderman, & 
Kirk, 1983). Thus, although gifted individuals may have higher test scores, their test scores 
profiles are not qualitatively different from those of average-ability individuals. 
Cognitive approaches to the study of intelligence can be classified into two: the 
cognitive components approach and the cognitive correlates approach (Pellegrino & Glaser, 
1984). Studies that used these approaches also have pointed toward quantitative differences 
between gifted and average-ability individuals. The cognitive components approach focuses 
on macro-level thinking processes. Studies that used this approach have shown that gifted 
individuals have better problem solving and metacognitive skills than have average-ability 
individuals of the same age (e.g., Campione, Brown, & Bryant, 1985; Low & Over, 1990). 
The quality of skills exhibited by gifted youth, however, has been found to be typical of 
individuals several years older than they are (e.g.. Dark & Benbow, 1990). The cognitive 
correlates approach, on the other hand, focuses on micro-level thinking processes. Studies 
that used this approach have shown that, in basic information-processing tasks, gifted 
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indi^dduals are faster and more accurate than are average-ability individuals (e.g.. Dark & 
Benbow, 1990; Goldberg, Schwartz, & Stewart, 1977; Jackson & McClelland, 1979; Palmer, 
MacLeod, Hunt, & Davidson, 1985). Therefore, studies that used cognitive approaches have 
suggested two ways in which thinking processes of intellectually gifted individuals are 
different from those of average-ability indi^dduals. First, thinking processes of gifted youth 
are typical of individuals several years older than they are. Second, thinking processes of 
gifted individuals result in faster and more accurate performance than those of average-ability 
individuals. These differences are more quantitative than qualitative in nature. 
Overview of Literature Review 
The current research was designed to determine whether gifted and average-ability 
individuals differ in the abilities to automatize thinking processes and to think through novel 
problems. The current research also was designed to determine whether any obtained 
differences are more quantitative or more qualitative in nature. 
The following literature review provides the theoretical and methodological 
background for the current research and includes the following topics; First, the review 
describes the components and processes of human memory according to a generic model. In 
the current research, it was assumed that whenever individuals automatize a skill or think 
through a novel problem, they do so using these memory components and processes. Second, 
because the current research took a cognitive correlates approach, the review describes the 
general goals and common weaknesses of this approach. This description should help clarify 
the ways in which the current research is similar to or different from typical cognitive 
correlates studies. Third, the review discusses the process of automatization in the context of 
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the instance theoiy of automaticity (Logan, 1988a, 1988b, 1990,1991,1992a, 1992b), which 
was the theory adopted in designing the current research. Fourth, the review describes how 
the ability for coping with novelty can be measured and how it possibly is related to the ability 
for automatization. Fifth, the review discusses how the abilities for automatization and copuig 
with novelty can both be considered in a single transfer-of-leaming experiment and how 
success in transfer of learning is constrjuned by the similarity between training and transfer 
stimuli. The difference between instance-based and process-based transfer also is discussed. 
A Generic Model of Human Memory 
It often is assumed that human memory operates as some kind of information-
processing system. Existing models of human information-processing systems (e.g., Atkinson 
& Shififrin, 1971; Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley, 1988; Baddeley& Hitch, 1974; Hintzman, 1986; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) vaiy substantially in some aspects, but nevertheless contain some 
common components and processes. These common components and processes shall 
constitute the generic model of human memory described below. 
The three basic components of the generic information-processing system are sensory 
memory, working memory (also called short-term memory), and long-term memory. Sensory 
memory receives all stimuli that are in the system's environment. Once the system attends to 
a stimulus in sensory memory, the system then encodes a copy or trace of the stimulus in 
working memory. This trace remains active in working memory until shortly after the system 
ceases to attend to it, whereupon it is with some probability stored in long-term memory. 
Working memory comprises two subcomponents, each of which is responsible for a 
major function. The buffer is the subcomponent where traces active in working memory are 
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stored. The central executive is the subcomponent responsible for most of the system's 
processing. Such processing may involve comparing features of traces that are currently in 
working memory, forming associations among these traces, or deciding on the basis of 
avmlable traces what response to make to the enviroimient. Processing that is controlled by 
the central executive is intentional and effortful; this processing is referred to as controlled 
processing. Not all the processing that the system does, however, is controlled by the central 
executive. Such nonexecutive processing is unintentional and effortless; this processing is 
referred to as automatic processing. 
Working memory is limited in capacity in the sense that the buffer has only a limited 
space for the storage of traces and the central executive can perform only a limited amount of 
processing. Although the storage and processing functions of working-memory are done by 
the two separate components, there is no separate and clear-cut allocation of capacity to these 
components. It is only when capacity is about to be exceeded that some allocation scheme 
takes effect (Just & Carpenter, 1992). 
Activation is the single commodity that supports both the storage and processing 
functions of working memory, and the largest possible amount of activation determines 
working-memory capacity (Just & Carpenter, 1992). Activation is applied to traces of stimuli 
in memory. To activate a trace may refer to any of the following processes: (a) to encode into 
working memory a trace of a stimulus in sensory memory, (b) to process, in some way, a trace 
in working memory, or (c) to transfer into the working-memory buffer a trace that is in long-
term memory. Activation of a long-term memory trace can be the result of either controlled 
processing or automatic processing; and it occurs (a) when there is a stimulus in sensory 
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memory that is similar to that trace, or (b) when there is an already activated trace in working 
memory that is similar to that trace (ICntzman, 1986; Logan, 1988b). 
In the discussions that follow, it is assumed that intellectual abilities, including the 
abilities for automatization and coping Avith novelty, are exercised through these memory 
components and processes. 
The Cognitive Correlates Approach to the Stu(fy of Intelligence 
Most studies of intelligence define giftedness in terms of high test scores on aptitude 
and achievement tests. Little would be known, however, about how various abilities 
contribute toward exemplary test performance without theories of intelligence that explain the 
mechanisms behind thinking processes (Jackson & Butterfield, 1986). Studies that used the 
cognitive correlates approach have attempted to explain the mechanisms behind thinking 
processes by invoking theories of memory and cognition. (See Snow & Lohman, 1989, and 
Verster, 1987, for pertinent reviews.) 
The cognitive correlates approach attempts to explain intellectual abilities in terms of 
basic memory processes. The general hypothesis is that exemplary test performance is related 
to efficient memory processes. In a typical cognitive correlates study, individuals are grouped 
with respect to intelligence test scores, and groups are then compared with respect to 
performance in tasks that tap some memory processes (e.g.. Hunt, Lunneborg, & Lewis, 
1975; Pellegrino & Glaser, 1979). [Correlational studies that do away with grouping have 
also been done, although the general hypothesis remains the same (e.g., Detterman, 1987; 
Nettelbeck, 1987)]. The time used up in doing these tasks is very often the variable of main 
interest, and a finding that associates high test scores with fast task performance is the main 
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supporting evidence for the hypothesis (Cooper & Regan, 1982). Examples of memory 
components and processes that have been studied in relation to intelligence test scores are: 
working-memory processing of di^t, letter, and location stimuli (Dark & Benbow, 1991), 
long-term memory access of words belon^g to certain categories (Hunt, Davidson, & 
Lansman, 1981), encoding of visual information (Jackson & McClelland, 1979), and recall of 
ordered lists of stunuli (Mukunda & Hall, 1992). 
Although studies that use the cognitive correlates approach can provide theory-based 
explanations of the mechanisms behind thinking processes, these studies are often confronted 
with certain problems. One problem is that of determuiing with certainty which memory 
processes are tapped by which experimental tasks (Cooper & Regan, 1982). Even if a definite 
correspondence were made between memory processes and experimental tasks, however, 
there remains the problem of determining how these memory processes are tapped by aptitude 
and achievement tests (Dark & Benbow, 1993; Pellegrino & Glaser, 1979). Moreover, speed 
of doing memory tasks tends to have a lower correlation with intelligence test scores than 
does performance in more complex tasks such as mathematical problem solving (Detterman, 
1987). This suggests that memory-processing speed may play only a minor role in intelligent 
behavior. It has been noted, for instance, that complex cognitive factors, such as problem-
solving strategies and prior knowledge of a task, may be more indicative of intelligent 
behavior than may memory-processing speed (Hunt, 1987; Marr & Sternberg, 1987; 
Pellegrino & Glaser, 1979). Generally, the more complex the task, the more closely related 
task performance is to intelligence test scores (Campione et al, 1985). 
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The current research used a cognitive correlates approach to study the abilities for 
automatization and coping with novelty. As should be made clear in later discussions, each of 
these abilities does not correspond to a single memory process; rather, each ability involves 
the interplay of several memory processes. Thus, these abilities are more complex than the 
abilities examined in typical cognitive correlates studies. Consequently, the experimental tasks 
chosen for the current research were more complex than the memory tasks used in typical 
cognitive correlates studies. In addition, other measures of performance, besides accuracy 
and reaction time, were obtained in these experimental tasks. Thus, the current research used 
the cognitive correlates approach while attempting to address some of the problems with the 
approach. 
Automatization and the Instance Theory of Automaticity 
Automatization as the Shift from Controlled Processing to Automatic Processing 
The generic model of human memory described earlier differentiates between two 
forms of processing; controlled processing, which is intentional, effortful, and governed by the 
limited-capacity central executive; and, automatic processing, which is unintentional, 
effortless, and not governed by the central executive. The development of automatization 
benefits an information-processing system, because automatized processing does not place 
demands on the limited capacity of working memory as does controlled processing. 
In the triarchic theory of intelligence, Sternberg (1986) claimed that the rate of 
automatization that takes place when repeatedly working on a task should be more closely 
related to intelligence than should sheer speed with which simple memory tasks were done. 
Automatization tasks described by Sternberg (1986,1991b) and included in his triarchic 
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abilities test were speeded tasks that involved scanning pairs of letters to detemune if each 
pair contained identical letters (case may or may not matter), scanning a configuration of 
letters in search of some target letters, and finding the digit corresponding to a given symbol 
based on a previously memorized list of digit-symbol pairs. These tasks were made 
increasingly complex by presenting more pairs of letters, or a larger configuration of letters, or 
a longer list of digit-symbol pairs. 
Various descriptions of how automatization occurs differ in substantial ways (e.g., 
Ericsson & Simon, 1984; Logan, 1988b; Royer, Cisero, & Carlo, 1993; Shifirin & Schneider, 
1977). One common element in these descriptions, however, is that automatization is 
characterized by a shift fi'om an intentional and effortful form of processing to an unintentional 
and effortless form of processing; or, in terms of the generic model of human memory, 
automatization is characterized by a shift fi'om controlled processing (processing governed by 
the central executive) to automatic processing (processing not governed by the central 
executive). Documenting this shift would necessitate a relatively longitudinal and continuous 
monitoring of task performance (Royer et al., 1993), such as is done in studies of skill 
acquisition (e.g., Ackerman, 1988; Stankov, 1991; Woltz, 1988). 
The following section describes the mechanism underlying the shift from controlled 
processing to automatic processing as specified in the instance theory of automaticity (Logan 
1988a, 1988b, 1992b). In the current research, the ability for automatization was 
conceptualized according to the instance theory. 
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Automaticitv as Memory Retrieval 
The instance theory of automaticity (Logan, 1988a, 1988b, 1992) assumes that 
whenever an information-processing system attends to a stimulus in the environment, it always 
encodes a trace of the stimulus in working memory. The theory also assumes that whenever 
an information-processing system attends to a stimulus in the environment, it always retrieves 
from long-term memory into working memory those traces that are similar to or associated 
with the environmental stimulus. Furthermore, the theory assumes that each trace of a 
stimulus is encoded and retrieved separately from other traces of the stimulus. The theory is 
called an instance theory because the representation of a stimulus in memory is made up of 
several traces (i.e., several instances) that have accumulated as a result of the system's 
repeated exposure to the stimulus. 
The instance theory describes how processing becomes automatized when a task is 
done repeatedly on a given stimulus. Given a paiiicular task, the appropriate response to the 
stimulus is determined either by using an algorithm or by retrieving from memory a trace of 
the stimulus that includes the response (Compton & Logan, 1991). Each time the stimulus is 
presented, algorithm use and memory retrieval proceed simuhaneously. If the algorithm is 
finished before any trace of the stimulus is retrieved in memory, then algorithm use determines 
the response. If a trace of the stimulus is retrieved in memory before the algorithm is finished, 
then memory retrieval determines the response. Thus, determination of the response is a race, 
in real time, between the algorithm appropriate to the task and the retrieval of each of the 
stimulus' traces in memory. 
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In general, the more traces there are in memoiy, the &ster memoiy retrieval becomes. 
Algorithm use is more likely to win the race during initial trials when there are only a few 
traces in memory. Memory retrieval is more likely to win the race during later trials when 
several traces have already accumulated in memoiy. Eventually, memory retrieval almost 
always wins the race over algorithm use. It is then said that automatization has occurred. 
Thus, according to the instance theory, automatization is the shift from algorithm use to 
memoiy retrieval and automaticity is memory retrieval (Compton & Logan, 1991). 
Response to Novelty 
Response to Novelty and Its Relationship to Automatization 
As previously mentioned, the abilities for automatization and coping with novelty are 
related. Automatized requisite skills facilitate the performance of novel tasks, and adeptness 
at responding to novel tasks facilitates their eventual automatization. In experimental tasks 
where performance is continuously monitored in order to observe automatization, there are 
two situations by which the relationship between the abilities for automatization and coping 
with novelty can be observed: (a) responding to novelty occurs before or together with task 
automatization, and (b) responding to novelty occurs only after task automatization has 
occurred. 
In the first of these two situations, research participants perform some novel task, and 
the less they rely on central-executive processing to understand the novel task, the more easily 
they can automatize the task. Sternberg (1988a) suggested that along an "experiential 
continuum', the contribution of intelligence to task performance is greatest at those times 
when a task is first encountered and when task automatization begins. 
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The second of these two situations applies in the traditional transfer-of-leaming 
experiment, where research participants are first trained on some task and then are transferred 
to (i.e., tested on) a novel but related task. There are also several real-life situations where 
responding to novelty in one task depends directly on automatization of another task. 
Examples of these situations are: being able to read fast because letter and word encoding has 
been automatized, being able to converse with someone while driving a vehicle because 
driving has been automatized (Sternberg, 1986) or, among children, being able to do 
arithmetic tasks efficiently because counting skills have been automatized (Hitch, Cundick, 
Haughey, Pugh, & Wright, 1987). 
Measuring the Ability to Respond to Noveltv 
Sternberg and colleagues used two tasks to test whether more intelligent individuals 
could better respond to novelty than could less intelligent individuals. In one of these tasks, 
research participants solved quantitative insight problems that did not require specialized 
mathematical knowledge (Davidson & Sternberg, 1984). An example of an insight problem 
used was, "A man has black socks and blue socks m a drawer mixed in a ratio of 4 to S. It is 
dark, and so the man cannot see the colors of the socks he removes from the drawer. How 
many socks need the man remove from the drawer in order to be assured of having a pair of 
socks of the same color?" The answer is three (Sternberg, 1988b; p. 281). Davidson and 
Sternberg (1984) found that gifted children were better at solving insight problems than were 
average-ability children. 
Another task involved verifying whether a statement could be validly inferred from a 
preceding statement (fact) that was to be considered true. In the nonnovel version of the task. 
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the "facts* were true in the real world. Li the novd version of the task, the &cts were 
counterfactual in the real world (Sternberg & Gastel, 1989). For example, in the nonnovel 
version of the task, the conclusion "Trees are harmless" was preceded by the factual statement 
"Trees need water'. In the novel version of the task, the same conclusion was preceded by the 
counterfactual statement "Trees harm people". It was found that performance on the novel 
version of the task was more highly correlated with fluid intelligence than was performance on 
the nonnovel version of the task. 
When choosing tasks that measure the ability to respond to novelty, it is important not 
to use highly familiar nor highly novel tasks. Marr and Sternberg (1977) claimed that most 
measures of intelligence, such as existing intelligence tests and basic information-processing 
tasks, are highly familiar tasks and do not adequately measure the ability to respond to 
novelty. Yet, Raaheim (1991) pointed out that a task should not be so novel that it no longer 
touches upon research participants' past experiences. For example, when participants solved 
a series of equivalent puzzles, a correlation between IQ and problem-solving ability was not 
found in the first problem, when the task was still highly novel, but only began to build up in 
the first few problems, when task novelty was beginning to wear off (Raaheim, 1991). Tasks 
used to measure the ability to respond to novelty also should be equally novel to all groups of 
participants (Pellegrino & Glaser, 1984). 
Combining the Abilities for Automatization and Coping With Novelty in a Single Experiment 
Most studies on task automatization and response to novelty have focused only on the 
ability for task automatization (e.g., Compton & Logan, 1991; Klapp, Boches, Travert, & 
Logan, 1991; Logan, 1988b; Logan & Klapp, 1991) or only on the ability for coping with 
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novelty (e.g., Davidson & Sternberg, 1984; Raaheim, 1991; Sternberg & Gastel, 1989). 
These studies did not consider both of these abilities withm one experiment. Yet, in order to 
see how one ability has a bearing on the other, it is important to study both abilities in a single 
experiment. 
Designing such an experiment is not a straightforward task, however. Tasks that 
measure the ability for automatization tend to be relatively simple strategy-free tasks that 
emphasize speed of performance (e.g., Logan, 1988b). On the other hand, tasks that measure 
the ability for coping with novelty tend to be relatively complex strategy-based tasks that 
emphasize accuracy of performance (e.g., Davidson & Sternberg, 1984). Yet, if the objective 
of an experiment is to see how ease in doing a novel task facilitates its eventual 
automatization, or to see how automatization of one task facilitates performance of a novel 
task, then the task used in automatization and the task used in coping with novelty should be 
similar to each other. These tasks, for instance, should require similar memory processes. 
The fact that different theoretical frameworks are used to explain the abilities for 
automatization and coping with novelty is another source of difficulty in the design of an 
experiment considering both abilities. The ability for automatization is reduced into basic 
processes such as the encoding and retrieval of traces in memory. On the other hand, the 
ability for coping v«th novelty is not explained in terms of basic memory processes, but in 
terms of more complex skills. For example, Sternberg (1988a; Davidson & Sternberg, 1984) 
explained the ability to solve insight problems in terms of the following skills: selective 
encoding (sifting relevant information from irrelevant information), selective combination 
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(combining relevant information in a novel way), and selective comparison (relating new 
information to old information in a novel way). 
Although the ability for coping with novelty is often explained in terms of complex 
skills, it also is possible to relate this ability to basic memory processes. Larson (1990), for 
example, suggested that performance on novel tasks is more closely linked to intelligence than 
is performance on nonnovel tasks, because novel tasks impose a greater load on working-
memory capacity than do nonnovel tasks. This explanation is supported by results of studies 
indicating that the more complex the memory processes required of a task, the greater is the 
working-memory capacity needed in doing the task, and the greater is the correlation between 
task performance and intelligence test scores (Just & Carpenter, 1992; Larson, 1990). 
Two points, therefore, need to be considered when designing an experiment that 
focuses on the abilities for automatization and for coping with novelty and on the relationship 
between these abilities. First, the task used in automatization and the task used in coping with 
novelty should be similar to one another. Second, because automatization is explained in 
terms of basic memory processes, it would be useful to explain response to novelty also in 
terms of basic memory processes, rather than in terms of more complex skills. The following 
section describes how the current research used a transfer-of-leaming experimental paradigm 
to address these points. 
Transfer of Learning 
Transfer of Learning and Intelligence 
A transfer-of-leaming experiment consists of two phases; the training phase, where 
participants are trained on some task, and the transfer phase, where participants are tested on 
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a new but related task. Transfer is said to be successful if participants are able to apply to the 
transfer task what they have learned during training (Stankov, 1991). If the transfer task is 
one that participants have not yet learned or mastered, transfer performance can be used as an 
indicator of the ability to respond to novelty. Hence, just as it has been hypothesized that the 
ability to respond to novelty can differentiate between more intelligent and less intelligent 
individuals, so too can it be hypothesized that the ability to transfer learning can differentiate 
between these two groups of individuals (Campione et al., 198S; Stankov, 1991). 
Instance-based and Process-based Transfer 
Transfer is constrained not only by the learners' ability levels, but also by the similarity 
between the training and transfer tasks. Studies and theories on transfer of learning indicate 
that transfer is likely to be successful only if the transfer task taps the same memory processes 
as does the training task (Bransford, Franks, Morris, & Stein, 1979; Phye, 1992; Roediger, 
1990). According to the instance theory of automaticity, however, it is not enough that the 
same memory processes are tapped by both training and transfer tasks. It should also be that 
similar stimuli are used in both tasks (Logan, 1988a, 1988b). Thus, there are two types of 
transfer; (a) process-based transfer, where transfer can be successful because the processes 
involved in the training and transfer tasks are similar, and (b) instance-based transfer, where 
transfer can be successful because the stimuli used in the training and transfer tasks are similar. 
Consider, for example, a transfer-of-leaming experiment where training, which 
involves repeatedly doing a task on the same set of stimuli, results in automatization. After 
automatization has occurred, research participants are able to do the task at a greatly speeded 
pace, because they no longer have to resort to some algorithm. Instead, they simply 
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remember what the appropriate response is to each presented stimulus; that is, they simply 
activate in working memory a trace of the presented stimulus. Because several traces of the 
stimulus have already accumulated in memory due to repeated exposure to the stimulus, 
activation of this trace is fast. 
Performance on a following transfer task is said to be successful if the speed-up in 
performance that occurred during training is maintained during transfer. From an instance-
theory perspective, if the transfer task involves an algorithm similar to that in training but uses 
stimuli markedly different from those in training, then the traces that accumulated m memory 
during training will not be useful during transfer. Memory retrieval can no longer be used, 
and it is necessary to revert to algorithm use. Thus, any speed-up in performance that is 
maintained during transfer cannot be due to the availability of pertinent traces in memory, but 
must be due to the increased efficiency with which the necessary algorithm is carried out. In 
this case, therefore, any speed-up in performance that is maintained during transfer is due to 
process-based transfer. 
If, on the other hand, the transfer task's algorithm is different from but is still related 
to the training algorithm, and if the transfer stimuli are similar to the training stimuli, then the 
traces that accumulated in memory during training will still be useful during transfer. Memory 
retrieval still can be used, and it is not necessary to revert to algorithm use. Thus, any speed­
up in performance that is maintained during transfer is due to the availability of pertinent 
traces in memory, and not due to the increased efficiency with which the necessary algorithm 
is carried out. In this case, therefore, any speed-up in performance that is maintained during 
transfer is due to instance-based transfer. 
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Instance-based Transfer Is Easier Than Process-based Transfer 
Most transfer-of-leaming experiments have examined process-based transfer, rather 
than instance-based transfer. Very often, the objective of these experiments was to determine 
the conditions that facilitate process-based transfer. For example, Phye (1989) examined 
transfer of learning using analogy and syllogism problems, and showed how performance 
during transfer to novel problems was facilitated by the advice and feedback received during 
training on problems of the same type. Bassok and Holyoak (1989) examined transfer of 
learning using structurally isomorphic problems in algebra and physics. They showed that 
training on arithmetic-progression problems in algebra facilitated performance on constant-
acceleration problems in physics, but that trdning on constant-acceleration problems in 
physics did not facilitate performance on arithmetic-progression problems in algebra. In 
studies such as these, the training and transfer tasks tapped similar processes but used 
different stimuli; the objective of training was to gain efSciency in carrying out an algorithm so 
that it can be readily applied to new problems. Thus, the focus of these studies was process-
based transfer and not instance-based transfer. 
Reviews of the transfer-of-leaming literature (e.g., Bassok & Holyoak, 1990; Phye, 
1992) have consistently pointed out the difficulty of achieving process-based transfer. In 
several experiments as well as in real-life school learning, learners would fail to apply during 
transfer the skills they had acquired during training, and could do so only if the transfer 
problems were very similar to the training problems. The fact that success of transfer is 
heavily dependent on the similarity between the training and transfer stimuli suggests that it is 
easier to achieve instance-based transfer than it is to achieve process-based transfer. 
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Results of experiments conducted by Logan (1988b) also suggest that for some tasks, 
instance-based transfer is easier than process-based transfer. In these experiments, 
participants were unable to maintain their automatized performance under a change of stimuli. 
In one of these experiments, participants were trained on a lexical decision task, where they 
indicated whether each string of letters was a word or a non-word. Transfer stimuli consisted 
of some of the training stimuli and some new stimuli. During transfer, the speed-up in 
performance that occurred during training was maintained when the training stimuli were 
presented but not when new stimuli were presented. 
In another experiment (Logan, 1988b), participants worked on an alphabet-arithmetic 
task. The task involved learning equations such as A + 4 = E (a true equation, because E is 
four letters down the alphabet from A) and A + 3 = E (a false equation). These equations 
were presented repeatedly to participants, who verified whether each equation was true or 
false. It was assumed that participants were counting if it took them longer to respond to 
equations with larger digits than to equations with smaller digits. It was assumed that 
participants were remembering their previous responses if they responded to equations with 
larger digits just as quickly as they did to equations with smaller digits. Thus, if response 
times were linearly regressed on the digits of the equations, a relatively steep slope would 
reflect counting, or algorithm use, whereas a relatively flat slope would reflect remembering, 
or memory retrieval. A decreasing pattern in slopes in the course of learning woul reflect the 
transition from counting to remembering and would serve as evidence for automatization 
(Compton & Logan, 1991; Klapp, Boches, Trabert, & Logan, 1991; Logan & Klapp, 1991). 
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In the alphabet-arithmetic experiment reported by Logan (1988b), participants trained 
on the alphabet-arithmetic task by repeatedly working on a set of equations that used the 
digits 2,3,4, and a set of six letters (e.g., B, C, D, E, F, G). During transfer, participants 
worked on equations that still used the digits 2,3,4, but used a different set of six letters 
(e.g., H, I, J, K, L, M). Response times were then linearly regressed on digits of the 
equations. Slopes of the resulting regression Imes became flatter as training on the initial 
letter set progressed, suggesting that participants underwent the shift from a counting 
algorithm to memory retrieval. The increase in slopes that characterized the change from one 
letter set to another, however, suggested that participants shifted back to a counting algorithm 
when a new set of letters was presented. 
These experimental results confirm that, in at least some tasks, transfer is not process-
based. That is, it is not the case that participants have become efficient in some process (e.g., 
making a lexical decision or adding 2, 3, or 4 to letters) that can be readily applied to transfer 
stimuli that are markedly different from the training stimuli. Rather, transfer is instance-based. 
That is, when traces that accumulated in memory during training are similar to the transfer 
stimuli, then the automatization that occurred during training can be maintained during 
transfer. In at least some tasks, therefore, the primary determinant of success in transfer is not 
the increased efficiency with which processing is carried out, but the accumulated products of 
such processing. 
General Objectives of the Current Research 
The current research is comprised of two transfer-of-leaming experiments that focused 
on the abilities for automatization and coping with novelty. As evident in the above literature 
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review, there are at least two factors that may influence the extent to which these abilities can 
be effectively exercised: (a) the intellectual abilities of the learners, and (b) the degree of 
similarity between training and transfer stimuli. These factors were examined in both 
experiments and are briefly described below. The general description applies to both 
experiments. Additional detdls on how each experiment examined these two factors will be 
discussed separately when each experiment is introduced. 
Intellectual Abilities of the Learners 
As mentioned earlier, the abilities for automatization and coping with novelty are, 
possibly, components of intelligence. If, indeed, these abilities are components of intelligence, 
then it is through these abilities that gifted individuals can be differentiated from average-
ability individuals. As also mentioned earlier, ability differences between gifted and average-
ability individuals appear to be quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. Existing studies 
provide two kinds of evidence in support of these statements: first, thinking processes of 
gifted youth are typical of individuals several years older than they are; and, second, thinking 
processes of gifted individuals result in faster and more accurate performance than those of 
average-ability individuals. 
One objective of the current research was to determine whether gifted individuals 
differ from average-ability individuals in the abilities for automatization and coping with 
novelty. A second objective of the current research was to determine whether any obtained 
differences are more quantitative or more qualitative in nature. 
To achieve these objectives, the performance of gifted youth was compared with the 
performance of average-ability individuals of the same age (Experiment 1), as well as with the 
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performance of older (i.e., college-age) individuals (Experiments 1 and 2). Results indicating 
that the performance levels of gifted youth are higher than those of same-age average-ability 
individuals would suggest that the abilities for automatization and coping with novelty are 
components of intelligence. Results indicating that the performance levels of gifted youth are 
comparable to those of older individuals would suggest further that performance differences 
between gifted and average-ability individuals are quantitative in nature in that intellectually 
gifted youth can be regarded as intellectually precocious. That is, intellectually gifted youth 
are intellectually developmentally advanced in that they are able to perform tasks much like 
adults do. 
Comparisons of performance levels among the three groups of individuals, by their 
nature, would yield quantitative rather than qualitative differences. For example, to say that 
gifted youth respond more accurately and more quickly to the exprimental stimuli than do 
same-age average-ability individuals, by the nature of the comparisons made, would indicate 
quantitative differences between these groups of individuals. In the current research, 
additional evidence pertaining to the quantitative-versus-quantitative-diflferences question was 
obtained by examining the performance of these groups of individuals under a variety of task 
conditions. Thus, the performance profile of each group across the different task conditions 
was obtained. 
Performance differences would be quantitative to the extent that the performance 
profile of gifted youth across the different task conditions is different from that of same-age 
average-ability individuals but similar to that of older individuals. This result would suggest 
that gifted youth and older individuals are on the same developmental stage and on a stage 
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higher than that of average-ability youth, at least with respect to the abilities t^ped by the 
experimental tasks. That is, gifted youth go through the same developmental stages as do 
average-ability individuals; however, the ^ed youth go through these developmental stages 
at a faster rate than do average-ability individuals. Thus, this result would provide further 
support to the notions that intellectually gifted youth are intellectually developmentally 
advanced and that intellectual giftedness is intellectual precocity. 
On the other hand, performance differences would be qualitative to the extent that the 
performance profile of gifted youth is different fi'om both the performance profile of same-age 
average-ability individuals and the performance profile of older individuals. This result would 
suggest that the developmental stages that gifted youth go through, at least with respect to the 
abilities tapped by the experimental tasks, are different from the stages that average-ability 
individuals go through. 
Degree of Similaritv Between Training and Transfer Stimuli 
In the two transfer-of-leaming experiments that made up the current research, the task 
conditions were varied according to the degree of similarity between trmning and transfer 
stimuli. The objective of varying the task conditions was not only to obtain performance 
profiles of the different groups of individuals across tasks, but also to determine how the 
degree of similarity between training and transfer stimuli may influence the extent to which the 
abilities for automatization and coping with novelty can be exercised. 
In particular, one objective of the current research was to determine whether coping 
with novelty through instance-based transfer would be more successful than coping with 
novelty through process-based transfer. Earlier, it was mentioned that instance-based transfer 
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is made possible by the traces that accumulated in memoiy as a result of the automatization 
that occurred during training. If these traces are similar to the transfer stimuli, then the 
information needed to determine the appropriate responses to the transfer stimuli is already 
contained in these traces. Therefore, the transfer task can be completed without performing 
the algorithm done during training; it is enough to simply retrieve the pertinent traces. 
Because memory retrieval is faster than algorithm use, transfer performance is facilitated, and 
instance-based transfer is said to be successful. 
If, however, the accumulated traces are different fi'om the transfer stimuli, then the 
information needed to determine the appropriate responses to the transfer stimuli is not 
contained in these traces. Therefore, the transfer task can be completed only by performing an 
algorithm; it is not enough to simply retrieve the traces in memory. If there is facilitation in 
transfer performance, this facilitation cannot be attributed to the availability of pertinent traces 
in memory, but can more likely be attributed to the increased efficiency with which the 
necessary algorithm is carried out. In this case, process-based transfer is said to be successful. 
A transfer-of-leaming procedure was used in the two experiments that made up the 
current research. During training, participants repeatedly performed a task on the same set of 
stimuli. Automatization was the objective of training. Training allowed for the accumulation 
of traces in memory so that the task could be done much faster by memory retrieval than by 
algorithm use. The ability to respond to novelty was assessed at transfer. During transfer, 
participants performed a task similar to the training task. Two kinds of transfer stimuli were 
used: stimuli that tested for instance-based transfer and stimuli that tested for process-based 
transfer. Stimuli that tested for instance-based transfer contained previously presented terms 
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in a format requiring a different but related algorithm. Stimuli that tested for process-based 
transfer had never appeared during training; these stimuli contained mostly novel terms in a 
format requiring the training algorithm. Additional details on the trainmg and transfer stimuli 
(along with examples) are discussed separately in each experiment. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Overview of Experiment J 
Alphabet-Arithmetic Task 
Measuring Rate of Automatization in the Alphabet-arithmetic Task 
Experiment 1 involved the alphabet-arithmetic task, which was one of the tasks used in 
testing the instance theory of automaticity (Compton & Logan, 1991; Klapp et al., 1991; 
Logan & Klapp, 1991). As described earlier, the alphabet-arithmetic task involves learning 
equations such as A + 4 = E (a true equation, because E is 4 letters down the alphabet from 
A) and A + 3 = E (a false equation). The equations are presented repeatedly to research 
participants, who verify whether each equation is true or false. Verification response times 
are then recorded. During initial trials, participants typically employ a counting algorithm that 
involves counting "A, B, C, D, E' as they keep track of the number of letters recited. After 
several trials on a relatively small set of equations, however, automatization is expected to 
occur. During later trials, participants would have memorized most of these equations and 
would base their responses more often on memory retrieval than on a counting algorithm. 
Performance in the alphabet-arithmetic task, thus, mimics the transition from counting 
algorithms to memory retrieval that occurs when children master addition facts. 
It is assumed that participants are counting if it takes them longer to respond to 
equations with larger digits than to equations with smaller digits. It is assumed that they are 
remembering their previous responses if they respond to equations with larger digits just as 
quickly as they do to equations with smaller digits. Thus, if response times are linearly 
regressed on the digits of the equations, a relatively steep regression slope would reflect 
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counting, or algorithm use, whereas a relatively flat regression slope would reflect 
remembering, or memory retrieval. A decreasing pattern in slopes in the course of learning 
the equations would reflect the transition from counting to remembering and would serve as 
evidence for automatization (Compton & Logan, 1991; Klapp et al., 1991; Logan & Klapp, 
1991). 
Compton and Logan (1991) showed that the slopes obtained by linearly regressing 
response times on the digits of the equations were accurate indicators of the rate of 
automatization that occurred during training on alphabet arithmetic. They based this 
conclusion on participants' responses. On some of the trials, participants were asked 
immediately after they responded to an equation whether they counted to get the answer or 
whether they remembered the answer. Reports of counting coincided with trials from which 
relatively steep slopes were obtained, whereas reports of remembering coincided with trials 
from which relatively flat slopes were obtained. 
Training and Transfer Stimuli Used in Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, one type of training stimuli and four types of transfer stimuli were 
used. Training stimuli were of the form "letter-addend + digit-addend = letter-sum" (e.g., C + 
2 = E). Transfer stimuli differed in the degree to which they were similar to the training 
stimuli. Three of the four types of transfer stimuli (commutativity, reflexivity, and 
subtraction) tested for instance-based transfer. These three types of transfer stimuli were very 
similar to the training stimuli in that they contained the same letters and digits as in the 
training stimuli. Thus, these transfer stimuli could be answered by simply retrieving traces 
that accumulated in memory. As an example, the transfer stimuli that corresponded to the 
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training stimulus C + 2 = E were: 2  + C - E  (conunutativity), E = C + 2 (reflexivity), and E -
C = 2 (subtraction). These transfer stimuli contained the same letters and digits as the 
corresponding training equation, although the letters and digits were presented in equation 
formats different from the equation format used in training. Among these three types of 
transfer, conunutativity and reflexivity had formats that were more similar to the training 
format, and subtraction had a format that was less similar to the training format. In 
conunutativity, the operation used was still addition; the letter-addend and digit-addend, 
however, were reversed. In reflexivity, the operation used was still addition; the left-hand side 
and the right-hand side of the equations, however, were reversed. In subtraction, the addition 
equation was reformulated as a subtraction equation, with the letter-sum becoming the 
minuend, the letter-addend becoming the subtrahend, and the digit-addend becoming the 
difference. 
The fourth type of transfer stimuli (add-one) tested for process-based transfer. 
Transfer stimuli of this type were different from the training stimuli and could not be answered 
by simply retrieving traces that accumulated in memory during training. As an example, the 
transfer stimuli that corresponded to the training stimulus C + 2 = E was C + 3 = F. To verify 
C + 3 = F, it was not enough to retrieve a trace for C + 2 = E. After retrieving this trace, it 
was also necessary to do one more count firom E to obtain F. In this case, linear regressions 
of response times on digits of the equations would result in relatively flat slopes. 
Alternatively, C + 3 = F could be verified by doing three counts firom C. In this case, linear 
regressions of response times on digits of the equations would result in relatively steep slopes. 
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Memory Network of Alphabet-arithmetic Equations 
Logan and Klapp (1991) suggested that training on the alphabet-arithmetic task 
simulates children's acquisition of basic arithmetic facts. When mastering basic arithmetic 
facts, children developmentally progress from reconstructive or counting-based strategies to 
reproductive or memory-based strategies (Findlay, 1978). By the time they are adults, they 
can automatically and almost perfectly retrieve arithmetic facts. Models of arithmetic-fact 
retrieval assume that traces in memory that correspond to arithmetic facts are organized in 
some form of a long-term memory network or structure. A long-term memory network of 
arithmetic knowledge should provide not only a structure for basic arithmetic facts, but also a 
structure for arithmetic operations. According to Resnick and Ford (1981), this structure 
incorporates not only arithmetic facts, but also properties of operations (e.g., addition and 
multiplication are commutative), the relationships among operations (e.g., addition and 
subtraction are inverses of each other), and the different roles that operands play in different 
operations (e.g., the sum becomes the minuend when an addition equation is reformulated as a 
subtraction equation). 
Virtually all models of arithmetic-fact retrieval assume that activation of traces in 
memory is the underlying mechanism of arithmetic-fact retrieval (e.g., Ashcrafl, 1992; 
Ashcrafl & Stazyk, 1981; Campbell, 1987; Campbell & Oliphant, 1992; McCloskey & 
Lindemann, 1992; Rickard, Healy, & Bourne, 1994; Siegler & Shrager, 1984). Activation of 
traces is determined by similarity, where similarity is determined by numeric values. A trace 
can be activated by an activated trace that is similar to it; it also can be activated by an 
environmental stimulus that is similar to it. It has been noted, for example, that retrieval 
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errors that adults make are very often answers to related number combinations, such as 4 x 6 
= 32 (Stazyk, Ashcraft, & Hamman, 1982), and that adults are slow in verifying equations that 
are true under a different operation, such as 6 + S = 1 (\\^ehnan & Schmidt, 1974). These 
types of retrieval errors illustrate how traces of similar arithmetic facts can activate each other. 
In Experiment 1, it was assumed that after training on a set of alphabet-arithmetic 
equations, traces of these equations that have accumulated in memory become organized in a 
network similar to, although much more limited than, the network of basic arithmetic facts. 
Because alphabet-arithmetic addition is very similar to the typical addition operation, it was 
assumed that properties of addition, namely, commutativity, reflexivity, and its inverse relation 
to subtraction, are incorporated in the network of alphabet-arithmetic equations. If, indeed, 
the properties of addition were incorporated in the network of alphabet-arithmetic equations, 
then the transfer stimuli: commutativity, reflexivity, and subtraction could be answered by 
simply retrieving pertinent traces in the network. 
Objectives of Experiment 1 
Measures of Performance Obtained in Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, each participant did the training task first, did the four types of 
transfer next, and then did a retest on the training equations. The four types of transfer were 
presented one after the other and in a different order for each participant. Retest contained 
the same stimuli as in training and was included in order to determine if the traces that 
accumulated in memory during training could still be retrieved at the end of transfer. If these 
traces were still retrievable at the end of transfer, it was assumed that the traces were available 
to be used during transfer. 
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Measures of accuracy, response time, and rate of automatization were obtained (a) for 
training, (b) for each type of instance-based transfer, (c) for process-based transfer, and (d) 
for retest. To obtain a measure of rate of automatization, each participant's response-time 
data were regressed on the digits of the alphabet-arithmetic equations. Regression was done 
(a) for each of the ten blocks of training, (b) for each type of instance-based transfer, (c) for 
process-based transfer, and (d) for retest. As described earlier, a relatively steep regression 
slope would reflect counting, or algorithm use, whereas a relatively flat regression slope 
would reflect remembering, or memory retrieval. A decreasing pattern in slopes in the course 
of learning the equations would reflect the transition from counting to remembering and 
would serve as evidence for automatization. 
Abilitv Differences Among Gifted Seventh and Eighth Graders. Averaee-abilitv Seventh and 
Eighth Graders, and College Students 
Experiment 1 included three groups of participants: gifted seventh and eighth graders, 
average-ability seventh and eighth graders, and college students. One objective of Experiment 
1 was to determine, in the context of the alphabet-arithmetic task, whether the abilities of 
gifted seventh and eighth graders for automatization and coping with novelty were better than 
those of average-ability seventh and eighth graders and comparable to those of college 
students. If differences were found between gifted and average-ability seventh and eighth 
graders in the abilities for automatization and coping with novelty, then another objective of 
Experiment 1 was to determine whether these differences were more quantitative or more 
qualitative in nature. The accuracy profile, response-time profile, and slope profile across (a) 
training, (b) each type of instance-based transfer, (c) process-based transfer, and (d) retest 
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were obtained for each group of participants. Differences would be quantitative to the extent 
that gifted youth were to exhibit performance profiles different from those of average-ability 
seventh and eighth graders, but similar to those of college students. Differences would be 
qualitative to the extent that gifted youth were to exhibit performance profiles that were 
different from the performance profiles of both average-ability seventh and eighth graders and 
college students. 
Instance-based and Process-based Transfer 
Another objective of Experiment 1 was to determine, in the context of the alphabet-
arithmetic task, whether instance-based transfer would be more successful than process-based 
transfer, and whether one type of instance-based transfer would be more successful than other 
types. The different types of transfer were compared with respect to accuracy, response time, 
and slope. Each type of transfer also was compared to the final block of training on these 
variables. A type of transfer was considered as successful if performance for this type of 
transfer was at least as good as the performance at the end of training. That is, a type of 
transfer was considered as successful if, for this type of transfer, (a) the accuracy score was at 
least as high as the accuracy score for the final training block, (b) the response time was at 
least as fast as the response time for the final training block, and (c) the slope was at least as 
flat as the slope for the final training block. A flat slope during the final training block and a 
steep slope during a type of transfer would indicate that although participants had already 
resorted to memory retrieval at the end of training, they shifted back to algorithm use during 
that type of transfer. A flat slope during the final training block and a comparably flat slope 
during a type of transfer would indicate that participants had already resorted to memory 
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retrieval at the end of training and continued to resort to memory retrieval during that type of 
transfer. 
Method 
Participants 
Gifted Youth 
Forty-three intellectually gifted seventh and eighth graders, with ages ranging from 12 
to 14 years, participated in this experiment. There were 30 males and 13 females. These 
youth were enrolled in Challenges for Youth - Talented and Gifted (CY-TAG), a summer 
program for gifted adolescents at Iowa State University (ISU). They were paid $5.00 each 
for participation. 
Students are admitted to the CY-TAG program on the basis of college-level 
performance on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). Among college-bound high school 
seniors, the 51st percentile for the SAT mathematics section was 500; the 51st percentile for 
the SAT verbal section was 430 (Stanley & Benbow, 1986). For the intellectually gifted 
youth who participated in this experiment, the mean SAT score for the mathematics section 
was 584 (SD = 87); the mean for the verbal section was 470 (SD = 82); and the mean for the 
composite was 1054 (^ = 124). 
College Students 
Forty-four first-year and second-year undergraduates from ISU participated in this 
study. There were 16 males and 28 females. These students were enrolled in introductoiy 
psychology courses and received extra credit for voluntary participation in the study. 
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Most ISU applicants take the American College Testing Assessment (ACT) rather 
than the SAT. For the college students who participated in this experiment, the mean ACT 
score for the mathematics section was 25 (SD = 5); the mean for the English section was 24 
(SD = 5); the mean for the reading section was 25 (SD = 6); and the mean for the composite 
was 25 (SD = 5). These scores were higher than the 1994 national norms. The norm for the 
mathematics section was 20 (SD = 5); the norm for the English section was 20 (SD = 5); the 
norm for the reading section was 21 (SD = 6); and the norm for the composite was 21 (^ = 
5). The college participants' mean ACT composite score of 25 was roughly equivalent to an 
SAT composite score of 1030 to 1060 (Educational Testing Service; as cited in ISU, 1995). 
Thus, the college participants' mean ACT composite score of 25 was roughly equivalent to 
the gifted youth's mean SAT score of 1054. 
Averaee-abilitv Youth 
Eighteen average-ability seventh and eightli graders, with ages ranging from 12 to 14 
years, were recruited from ISU's neighboring areas for participation in this experiment. There 
were 9 males and 9 females. These youth scored between the 50th and 90th percentiles on the 
mathematics and reading sections of the Iowa Test of Basic Skills. Five participants were paid 
$5.00 each for participation. A pizza party was hosted for the others in exchange for their 
participation. 
Parental permission was obtained for both gifted and average-ability youth. 
Stimuli 
Procedures for generating training equations were adapted from Compton and Logan 
(1991). Three different groups of six letter-addends were used: B, C, D, E, F, G; and H, I, J, 
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K, L, and N, O, P, Q, R, S. The group of letter-addends assigned to each participant was 
determined randomly. For each participant, a set of 12 training equations were computer-
generated through the following procedure: True equations were generated by randomly 
pairing the digit-addend 2 to two letter-addends, randomly pairing the di^t-addend 3 to two 
other letter-addends, and pairing the digit-addend 4 to the remaining two letter-addends. 
False equations were generated from true equations by using sums that were one letter up the 
alphabet from the true sums. A sample set containing both tr^ng and transfer equations is 
shown in Table 1. 
Four types of transfer equations were generated from each of the 12 training equations 
through the following rules: (a) commutativity, reverse the order of digit- and letter-addends, 
(b) reflexivity, write the letter-sum in the left-hand side of the equation and the letter- and 
digit-addends in the right-hand side of the equation, (c) subtraction, formulate the addition 
equation as a subtraction equation using the digit-addend as the difference, and (d) add-one, 
increase the digit-addend by one and adjust the letter-sum accordingly. 
Procedure 
Participants read the equations and entered their responses on IBM-compatible 386 or 
486 personal computers with color monitors. Each participant was assigned a computer and 
participants were tested in groups of three to ten. Instructions and tasks were programmed 
using the MicroExperimental Laboratory software package (Schneider, 1988). A1000-
millisecond fixation marker preceded each presentation of the set of 12 training equations, 
each presentation of each of the four sets of transfer equations (each set having 12 equations), 
and each presentation of the set of 12 retest equations. Equations remained on the computer 
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Table 1 
A Sample Set of Training and Transfer Alphabet-arithmetic Equations 
True Equations False Equations 
C  +  2  =  E  C  +  2  =  D  
F  +  2  =  H  F  +  2 =  G  
Training Equations E + 3= H E + 3= 6 
G + 3= J G + 3 = I 
B + 4 = F B + 4 = E 
D + 4 = H D + 4 = G 
2 + C = E 2 + C = D 
2 + F  =  H  2  +  F  =  G  
Commutativity 3+E = H 3 + E = G 
3 + G  =  J  3 + G  =  I  
4 + B  =  F  4  +  B  =  E  
4 + D  =  H  4  +  D  =  G  
E - C = 2 D - C = 2 
H - F  =  2  G - F  =  2  
Subtraction H-E = 3 G-E=3 
J - G  =  3  I - G = 3  
F - B  =  4  E - B  =  4  
D  =  4  G - D  =  4  Transfer Equations ^ 
E  =  C  +  2  D  =  C  +  2  
H  =  F  +  2  G  =  F  +  2  
Reflexivity H = E+ 3 G = E+ 3 
J  =  G  +  3  I  =  G +  3  
F  =  B  +  4  E  =  B  +  4  
H  =  D  +  4  G  =  D  +  4  
C  +  3  =  F  C  +  3  =  E  
F  +  3  =  I  F  +  3 =  H  
Add-one E + 4 = I E + 4= H 
G + 4 = K G + 4 = J 
B + 5 = G B + 5 = F 
D + 5 = I D + 5 = H 
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screen until a response was made. A 1000-millisecond intertrial blank occurred between 
equations. 
Training 
There were 10 training bloclcs. Each block consisted of three successive presentations 
of the set of 12 training equations. Thus, each equation was presented 30 times during 
training. The 12 equations in a set appeared in a random and different order from presentation 
to presentation. After every two trdning blocks (72 equations), there was a period of rest, 
which was terminated by the participant's pressing the space bar. 
Transfer 
The four types of transfer equations (commutativity, reflexivity, subtraction, and add-
one) were presented immediately after training. The four types were presented one after the 
other and in a different random order for each participant. There was one block of trials for 
each type of transfer, where a block consisted of three successive presentations of the set of 
12 equations. As in training, the 12 equations in a set appeared in a random and different 
order from presentation to presentation. Each type of transfer equations was followed by a 
period of rest, which was terminated by the participant's pressing the space bar. 
Retest 
Retest immediately followed transfer. Retest consisted of one block of trials in which 
the set of 12 training equations was presented three times. As in training and transfer, the 12 
training equations appeared in a random and different order from presentation to presentation. 
For half of the participants, the"?" key was used to enter a "true" response and the V 
key was used to enter a "false" response. For another half of the participants, the"?" key was 
38 
used to enter a 'false' response and the 'z' key was used to enter a true' response. T* and 'F 
markers, representing 'true' and 'false', respectively, were placed on the appropriate keys. 
Participants were instructed on how to verify whether an equation was true or false. 
They were told that equations could be verified either by counting or by remembering and 
were advised to use, for each equation, the strategy that would result in a fast but accurate 
response. The feedback "Correct Response' or "Wrong Response" appeared on the monitor 
for 1000 milliseconds immediately after each response. Participants were told that the same 
set of equations would be presented repeatedly and that they should expect to get faster as 
training proceeded. For transfer and retest equations, participants were informed that new 
equations would be presented, but they were not instructed on how to verify these equations. 
They were, however, advised to try to use the training equations in verifying the transfer 
equations. 
Participants were appropriately debriefed after the experiment. Most participants took 
45 to 60 minutes to finish the entire experiment. 
Results 
Response times less than 150 milliseconds (ms) or greater than 9000 ms and their 
corresponding accuracy scores were not included in the following statistical analyses. These 
deleted observations comprised less than one per cent of the entire data set. It was assumed 
that with response times less than 150 ms, participants were just typing theu* responses 
without even reading the stimuli. It also was assumed that with response times greater than 
9000 ms, participants were resting or focusing on some other things before typing their 
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responses. Because response times for incorrect responses may reflect unsystematic &ctors, 
only response times for correct responses were included in the following analyses. 
For each training block, for each type of transfer, and for retest, each participant's 
performance was measured in terms of three dependent variables; mean accuracy score 
(reported as a proportion), mean response time (in ms), and slope of the regression line 
obtained by regressing response times on the digits of the equations (in ms per digit). 
A .05 level of significance was used in all analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and 
pairwise comparisons of means. Pairwise comparisons of means were done by calculating 
Fisher's least significant differences (LSDs). If a pairwise comparison of means involved a 
linear combination of mean squares as the error term, the Cochran-Satterthwaite formula 
(Snedecor & Cochran, 1989) was used to approximate degrees of freedom (df). Approximate 
degrees of freedom were needed in the computation of the LSDs. Because each group of 
participants (gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups) had different sample sizes, more than one 
LSD value was computed for each set of pairwise comparisons. Whenever pairwise 
comparisons among group means were done, two LSDs are reported: the LSD between 
means of the gifted and college groups, and the LSD between means of the gifted and grade 
7/8 groups. Whenever pairwase comparisons of means within a group were done, three LSDs 
are reported: the LSD among means within the gifted group, the LSD among means Avithin 
the college group, and the LSD among means wthin the grade 7/8 group. 
The variables gender (male vs. female), letter set (B to G; H to M; N to S), and truth 
(true equations vs. false equations) were not included in the statistical analyses reported 
below. Preliminary ANOVAs indicated that these variables did not interact reliably with the 
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variables of main interest. The effects of gender and letter set on accuracy, response time, and 
slope were not reliable. The effect of truth on accuracy was reliable, but its effect on response 
time was not. A dependent-samples t-test indicated that true comparisons were responded to 
m o r e  a c c u r a t e l y  Q s l  =  0 . 9 0 7 ,  S D  =  0 . 0 6 2 )  t h a n  w e r e  f a l s e  c o m p a r i s o n s  ( M  =  0 . 8 6 7 ,  § D  =  
0.088), t(104) = 6.28, SE = 0.30. The effect of truth on slope could not be determined, 
because true and false equations were combined when linearly regressing response times on 
the digits of the equations. 
Training 
Three ANOVAs were done, one for each of the dependent variables: accuracy, 
response time, and slope. In these ANOVAs, group (gifted vs. college vs. grade 7/8) was a 
between-subjects variable and training block (blocks one to ten) was a within-subjects 
variable. 
Training Accuracy 
Group effect. The group effect on accuracy was only marginally reliable, F(2,102) = 
2.85, MSB = 0.04, p = 0.06. The mean accuracy scores of the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 
groups were 0.905 (SE = 0.003), 0.906 (SE = 0.003), and 0.867 (SE = 0.007), respectively. 
Block effect. The block effect on accuracy was not reliable, indicating that accuracy 
level, in general, did not change throughout training, F(9, 918)=1.76, MSE = 0.003; however, 
there were group differences as presented below. The mean accuracy scores across the ten 
training blocks are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Accuracy Scores Across the Ten Training Blocks 
Block M SE 
1 0.892 0.009 
2 0.902 0.007 
3 0.889 0.008 
4 0.885 0.009 
5 0.896 0.008 
6 0.902 0.008 
7 0.905 0.008 
8 0.913 0.007 
9 0.903 0.009 
10 0.903 0.008 
Group X Block interaction effect. The Group X Block interaction effect on accuracy 
was reliable F(18, 918) = 1.70, MSE = 0.003. The mean accuracy scores of the three groups 
across the ten training blocks are shown in Table 3 and are plotted in Figure 1.' 
To follow up on the reliable Group X Block interaction effect, mean accuracy scores 
of the groups were compared for each training block.^ As these comparisons indicate and as 
Figure 1 shows, the gifted and college groups had comparable accuracy throughout training, 
LSD = 0.036, approximate df = 75. The gifted group had higher accuracy than the grade 7/8 
group mostly in the latter blocks but not in the initial blocks. In particular, the gifted group 
had reliably higher accuracy than the grade 7/8 group in blocks six, seven, and nine, LSD = 
0.046, approximate df = 75. The differences in accuracy scores between the gifted and grade 
7/8 groups may be due to the slightly decreasing trend (see Figure 1) in the accuracy scores of 
the grade 7/8 group. The decreasing trend occurred mainly fi-om blocks two through three. 
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Tables 
Accuracy Scores Across the Ten Training Blocks of the Gifted, College, and Grade 7/8 
Groups 
Block Gifted College Grade 7/8 
M SE M SE M SE 
1 0.907 0.013 0.879 0.016 0.887 0.021 
2 0.902 0.011 0.904 0.010 0.897 0.021 
3 0.891 0.011 0.900 0.011 0.858 0.023 
4 0.884 0.015 0.898 0.011 0.853 0.030 
5 0.908 O.OII 0.896 0.012 0.867 0.026 
6 0.914 0.012 0.905 0.011 0.865 0.027 
7 0.918 0.010 0.911 0.011 0.860 0.033 
8 0.911 0.010 0.928 0.009 0.881 0.025 
9 0.911 0.012 0.922 0.009 0.839 0.034 
10 0.903 0.009 0.919 0.010 0.864 0.028 
0.94 
0.92 
0.9 
0 
M 0.88 
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1 0.86 
s 
e 0.84 9 01 
^ 0.82 
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Grade 7/8 0.8 
0.78 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 1 9 
Training Block 
Figure 1. Accuracy scores across the ten training blocks of the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 
groups 
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Trdning Response Time 
Group effect. The group effect on response time was reliable, F(2,102) = 18.24, 
MSE = 3,263,559. The mean accuracy scores of the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups 
were 2179 ms (SE = 30), 2044 ms (SE = 22), and 2989 ms (SE = 52), respectively. The 
gifted and college groups had comparable response times, LSD = 243, df = 102. The gifted 
group had a faster response time than the grade 7/8 group, LSD = 318, df = 102. 
Block effect. The block effect on response time was reliable, F(9, 918) = 227.44, 
MSE = 124,991. The mean response times across the ten training blocks are shown in Table 
4 and are plotted in Figure 2. As evident in Figure 2, response times continuously decreased 
as training proceeded (LSD between response times for two blocks = 97, df = 918). The 
decrease in response times between two successive blocks was generally larger for initial 
blocks than for latter blocks. 
Group X Block interaction effect. The Group X Block interaction effect on response 
time was reliable, F(19,918) = 4.53, MSE = 124,991. The mean response times of the three 
groups across the ten training blocks are shown in Table 5 and are plotted in Figure 3. 
To follow up on the reliable Group X Block interaction effect, mean response times 
across the different blocks were compared for each group. The LSDs between response times 
for two blocks were 149,148, and 231 ms, respectively, for gifted, college, and grade 7/8 
groups, df = 918. As these comparisons indicate and as Figure 3 shows, response times of all 
groups continuously decreased as training proceeded. For all groups, the decrease in response 
times between two successive blocks was generally larger for initial blocks than for latter 
blocks. Differences in response times between blocks, however, were consistently larger for 
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Table 4 
Response Times Across the Ten Training Blocks 
Block M SE 
1 3330 102 
2 2876 89 
3 2534 77 
4 2371 70 
5 2155 69 
6 2092 67 
7 1917 66 
8 1867 68 
9 1743 62 
10 1732 66 
3500 T 
3000 • • 
I 2500 • • 
p 
S 2000 • • 
S 1500 • -
J 1000 • • 
500 -
10 5 6 7 8 9 3 4 1 2 
Training Bloci( 
Figure 2 Response times across the ten training blocks 
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Tables 
Response Times Across the Ten Training Blocks of the Gifted, College, and Grade 7/8 
Groups 
Block Gifted College Grade 7/8 
M SE M SE M SE 
1 3152 118 3028 122 4496 259 
2 2784 114 2557 103 3872 203 
3 2406 98 2305 86 3402 184 
4 2237 95 2186 73 3143 177 
5 2111 91 1952 76 2759 208 
6 1980 90 1915 74 2791 165 
7 1870 99 1738 65 2467 186 
8 1832 97 1672 61 2423 221 
9 1728 95 1563 62 2217 162 
10 1693 93 1527 54 2327 219 
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Figure 3. Response times across the ten training blocks of the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 
groups 
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the grade 7/8 groups than for either the ^ed or college groups. For the grade 7/8 group, the 
average decrease from an earlier block to a latter block was 843 ms. On the other hand, the 
averages were only S46 and SSS ms, respectively, for the ^ ed and college groups. 
Training Slope 
Group effect. The group efifect on slope was reliable, F(2,102) = 4.97, MSE = 
812,322. The mean slopes of the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups were 3S2 ms per digit 
(SE = 15), 273 ms per digit (SE =10) and 524 ms per digit (SE = 27), respectively. The 
gifted and college groups had comparable slopes, LSD = 121, df = 102. The gifted group had 
a flatter slope than the grade 7/8 group, LSD = 158, df = 102. 
Block effect. The block effect on slope was reliable, F(9,918) = 25.40, MSE=81.939. 
The mean slopes across the ten training blocks are shown in Table 6 and are plotted in Figure 
4. As evident in Figure 4, slopes became flatter as training proceeded (LSD between slopes 
for two block = 77, df =918). The decrease in slopes was generally larger for initial blocks 
than for latter blocks. Slopes ceased to decrease at block eight; slopes for blocks eight, nine, 
and ten were not reliably different. The decrease in slopes suggests that as training 
proceeded, participants shifted from counting to memory retrieval. 
Group X Block interaction effect. The Group X Block interaction effect on slope was 
not reliable, F(18, 918) = 1.01, MSE = 81,939. The mean slopes of the three groups across 
the ten training blocks are shown in Table 7 and are plotted in Figure 5. 
The absence of a reliable Group X Block interaction effect on slope suggests that 
decreases in slopes from earlier blocks to latter blocks, as shown in Figure 5, were comparable 
across groups. This in turn suggests that, across the three groups, there were parallel shifts 
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Table 6 
Slopes Across the Ten Training Blocks 
Block M SE 
1 678 41 
2 506 43 
3 413 36 
4 437 43 
5 324 42 
6 278 45 
7 256 43 
8 213 36 
9 203 37 
10 178 35 
700 
6 0 0 -
5 0 0 -
eo 400 -
3 0 0 -
2 0 0 -
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Figure 4. Slopes across the ten training blocks 
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Table? 
Slopes Across the Ten Training Blocks of the Gifted. College, and Grade 7/8 Groups 
Block Gifted College Grade 7/8 
M SE M SE M SE 
1 712 56 594 54 802 128 
2 580 60 431 42 510 166 
3 409 53 345 40 590 116 
4 431 62 337 45 692 135 
5 335 57 249 43 482 166 
6 252 60 192 57 552 136 
7 261 70 164 42 466 105 
8 198 55 143 47 418 80 
9 157 59 166 39 406 105 
10 188 52 108 35 324 123 
900 
'College 
Grade 7/8 
600 
600 
S 400 
300 
200--
100 •• 
1 2 3 4 6 6 7 9 10 
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Figure S. Slopes across the ten training blocks of the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups 
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from counting to memory retrieval as training proceeded. Thus, it may be said that the three 
groups exhibited comparable rates of automatization. 
Transfer 
Data for the following types of blocks were included in all analyses of transfer 
performance; final training block, transfer blocks (commutativity, reflexivity, subtraction, add-
one), and retest block. 
Three ANOVAs were done, one for each of the dependent variables: accuracy, 
response time, and slope. In these ANOVAs, group was a between-subjects variable and type 
of block (final training block, transfer blocks, and retest block) was a within-subjects variable. 
Where type of block or Group X Type of Block interaction effects were reliable, the 
following pairwise comparisons of means were made; 
First, the means for the retest block were compared to the means for the final training 
block to determine whether the learning achieved during training was retained until the end of 
transfer. This would be the case if the means for retest were comparable to or better than 
(i.e., higher accuracy, faster response time, or flatter slope) the means for the final training 
block. 
Second, the means for the different transfer blocks were compared to the means for 
the final training block to determine if transfer was successfiil. This would be the case if the 
means for a transfer block were comparable to or better than the means for the final tr^ning 
block. 
Third, means for the different transfer blocks were compared to determine which 
blocks showed the best and worst performance. 
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The second and third sets of comparisons were done to determine whether instance-
based transfer was more successful than process-based transfer, and whether one type of 
instance-based transfer was more successful than other types. As mentioned earlier, add-one 
tested for process-based transfer; the stimuli in this type of transfer were mostly novel, 
although the letter-addends were the same as in training. Commutativity, reflexivity, and 
subtraction tested for instance-based transfer; the stimuli in these types of transfer were only 
novel in format; the digits and letters appeared during training, but were presented during 
transfer in equation formats different from that in training. Also as mentioned earlier, it was 
assumed that commutativity and reflexivity had formats that were more similar to the training 
format, and subtraction had a format that was less similar to the training format. Among the 
four types of transfer, add-one had a format that was least similar to the training format. 
Transfer Accuracy 
Group effect. The group effect on accuracy was reliable, F(2,102) = 8.18, MSE = 
0.04. The mean accuracy scores of the gifled, college, and grade 7/8 groups were 0.892 (SE 
= 0.004), 0.879 (SE = 0.004), and 0.811 = 0.011), respectively. The gifted and college 
groups had comparable accuracy, LSD = 0.036, df = 102. The gifted group had a higher 
accuracy score than the grade 7/8 group, LSD = 0.047, df = 102. 
Type of block effect. The type of block effect on accuracy was reliable, F(5, 510) = 
13.18, MSE = 0.01. Shown in Table 8 are the mean accuracy scores for the final training 
block, retest block, and transfer blocks. 
To follow up on the reliable block effect, comparisons were made among the mean 
accuracy scores across the different blocks. The LSD between accuracy scores for two blocks 
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Table 8 
Accuracy Scores Across Final Training, Retest and 
Transfer Blocks 
Block M S£ 
Final Training 
Retest 
Commutativity 
Subtraction 
Reflexivity 
Add-one 
0.903 
0.878 
0.880 
0.887 
0.850 
0.818 
0.008 
0.011 
0.013 
0.012 
0.011 
0.012 
was 0.022, df = 510. Results of these pairwise comparisons indicate the following: First, 
retest performance was reliably less accurate than fmal training performance, suggesting that 
the transfer tasks produced interference of some sort. Second, the accuracy score for 
subtraction was comparable to the accuracy score for final training, but accuracy scores for 
commutativity, reflexivity, and add-one were reliably lower than the accuracy score for final 
training. Third, accuracy scores for commutativity and subtraction were comparable and were 
the highest among the transfer blocks; the next highest accuracy score was for reflexivity; and, 
the lowest accuracy score was for add-one. Possible explanations for accuracy differences 
among the different types of transfer are considered in the discussion section. 
Group X Tvpe of Block interaction effect. The Group X Type of Block interaction 
effect on accuracy was not reliable, F(10, 510) = 1.07, MSB = 0.006. Shown in Table 9 and 
plotted in Figure 6 are the mean accuracy scores of the three groups for the final training 
block, retest block, and transfer blocks. 
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Table 9 
Accuracy Scores of the Gifted, College, and Grade 7/8 Groups for Final Training, Retest, 
and Transfer Blocks 
Block Gifted College Grade 7/8 
M SE M SE M SE 
Final Training 0.903 0.009 0.920 0.010 0.864 0.040 
Retest 0.875 0.017 0.914 0.013 0.793 0.037 
Commutativity 0.890 0.015 0.904 0.011 0.799 0.041 
Subtraction 0.896 0.017 0.910 0.011 0.808 0.041 
Reflexivity 0.863 0.015 0.876 0.018 0.754 0.043 
Add-one 0.816 0.020 0.839 0.017 0.772 0.040 
0 . 9 -
0.8 •• 
0.6 --
0.3 
College Gifted Grade 7/8 
•Final Training 
B Retest 
DConmutativity 
•Subtraction 
• Reflexivity 
•Add-one 
Figure 6. Accuracy scores of the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups for final training, 
retest, and transfer blocks 
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The absence of a reliable Group X Type of Block interaction effect suggests parallel 
performance profiles, in terms of accuracy, for the three groups of participants across the final 
training block, retest block, and transfer blocks. Such parallel performance profiles are 
evident in Figure 6. 
Transfer Response Time 
Group effect. The group effect on response time was reliable, F(2,102) = 9.00, MSB 
= 1,525,861. The mean response times of the gifled, college, and grade 7/8 groups were 1953 
ms (SE = 25), 2108 ms (SE = 36), and 2676 ms (SE = 59), respectively. The gifted and 
college groups had comparable response times, LSD = 214, df = 102. The gifted group had a 
faster response time than the grade 7/8 group, LSD = 280 df = 102. 
Type of block effect. The block effect on response time was reliable, F(5, 510) = 
46.19, MSE = 228,828. Shown in Table 10 are the mean response times for the final training 
block, retest block, and transfer blocks. 
Table 10 
Response Times Across Final Training, Retest, 
and Transfer Blocks 
Block M SE 
Final Training 
Retest 
Commutativity 
Subtraction 
Reflexivity 
Add-one 
1732 
1517 
1853 
1875 
2181 
2495 
66 
62 
84 
66 
75 
61 
54 
To follow up on the reliable type of block effect, comparisons were made among the 
mean response times across the different blocks. The LSD between response times for two 
blocks was 129 ms, df == 510. Results of these pairwise comparisons indicate the foUowing; 
First, retest performance was reliably faster than final training performance. Second, the 
response time for commutativity was comparable to the response time for final training, but 
response times for subtraction, reflexivity, and add-one were reliably slower than the response 
time for final training. Third, response times for commutativity and subtraction were 
comparable and were the fastest among the transfer blocks; the next fastest response time was 
for reflexivity; and, the slowest response time was for add-one. Note that the ordering of 
transfer tasks in terms of response time mirrored the pattern found for accuracy. Possible 
explanations for response-time differences among the different types of transfer are considered 
in the discussion section. 
Group X Type of Block interaction effect. The Group X Type of Block interaction 
effect on response time was not reliable, F(10, 510) = 0.53, MSE = 228,829. Shown in Table 
11 and plotted in Figure 7 are the mean response times of the three groups for the final 
training block, retest block, and transfer blocks. 
The absence of a reliable Group X Type of Block interaction effect suggests parallel 
performance profiles, in terms of response time, for the three groups of participants across the 
final training block, retest block, and transfer blocks. Such parallel performance profiles are 
evident in Figure 7. 
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Table 11 
Response Times of the Gifted, College, and Grade 7/8 Groups for Final Training, Retest, 
and Transfer Blocks 
Block Gifted College Grade 7/8 
M SE. M SE M SE 
Final Training 1693 93 1527 54 2327 219 
Retest 1516 85 1365 56 1888 227 
Commutativity 1863 96 1674 62 2265 179 
Subtraction 1881 99 1727 64 2220 219 
Reflexivity 2205 103 1969 80 2642 343 
Add-one 2448 105 2380 77 2890 270 
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Figure 7. Response times of the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups for the final training, 
retest, and transfer blocks 
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Transfer Slope 
Group effect. The group effect on slope was not reliable, F(2,102) = 2.83, MSE = 
462,694. The mean slopes of the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups were 2S2 ms per digit 
(SE = 12), 198 ms per digit (SE = 17) and 385 ms per digit (§E = 30), respectively. The feet 
that the group effect on slope was not reliable indicates that the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 
groups exhibited comparable amounts of counting. 
Type of block effect. The type of block effect on slope was reliable, F(5, 510) = 5.14, 
MSE = 66,571. Shown in Table 12 are the mean slopes for the final training block, retest 
block, and transfer blocks. 
Table 12 
Slopes Across Final Training, Retest, and 
Transfer Blocks 
Block M ^ 
Final Trmning 178 35 
Retest 142 40 
Commutativity 207 37 
Subtraction 125 37 
Reflexivity 183 41 
Add-one 253 30 
To follow up on the reliable type of block effect, comparisons were made among the 
mean slopes across the different blocks. The LSD between slopes for two blocks was 70 ms 
per digit, df = 510. Results of these pairwise comparisons indicate the following: First, the 
slope for retest was comparable to the slope for final training. This suggests that the rate of 
automatization achieved at the end of training was maintained until the end of transfer. 
57 
Second, slopes for commutativity, reflexivity, and subtraction were comparable to the slope 
for final training, but the slope for add-one was reliably steeper than the slope for final 
traimng. This suggests that the rate of automatization achieved at the end of training was 
maint^ed during transfer to commutati\dty, reflexi>dty, and add-one, but it was not 
maintiuned during transfer to add-one. Third, the flattest slope was for subtraction, and the 
steepest slopes were for commutativity and add-one. The slope for reflexivity was not reliably 
different fi'om the slope for subtraction, but neither was it reliably different fi'om the slopes for 
commutativity and add-one. In terms of slope, therefore, the best performance was in 
subtraction and the worst performance was in commutativity and add-one. Possible 
explanations for slope differences among the different types of transfer are considered in the 
discussion section. 
Group X Type of Block interaction effect. The Group X Type of Block interaction 
effect on slope was not reliable, F(10, 510) = 1.49, MSB = 66,571. Shown in Table 13 and 
plotted in Figure 8 are the mean slopes of the three groups for the final training block, retest 
block, and transfer blocks. 
The absence of a reliable Group X Type of Block interaction effect suggests parallel 
performance profiles, in terms of slope, for the three groups across the different types of 
blocks. Figure 8, however, suggests that commutativity and add-one blocks were relatively 
more difficult for the grade 7/8 group than were the other transfer blocks. This was not the 
case for the gifted and college groups. Possible explanations for this group difference are 
considered in the discussion section. 
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Table 13 
Slopes of the Gifted, College, and Grade 7/8 Groups for Final Training, Retest, and 
Transfer Blocks 
Block Gifted College Grade 7/8 
M SE M SE M SE 
Final Training 188 52 108 35 324 123 
Retest 167 52 93 29 199 78 
Commutativity 175 61 156 45 404 125 
Subtraction 107 55 116 44 190 116 
Reflexivity 191 56 149 41 248 122 
Add-one 224 55 168 51 530 121 
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Figure 8. Slopes of the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups for final training, retest, and 
transfer blocks 
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Discussion 
Ability Differences Among the Gifted. College, and Grade 7/8 Groups 
As mentioned earlier, one objective of Experiment 1 was to determine, in the context 
of the alphabet-arithmetic task, whether the abilities of gifted seventh and eighth graders for 
automatization and coping with novelty were better than those of average-ability seventh and 
eighth graders and comparable to those of college students. And, given a difference in ability 
between gifted and average-ability seventh and eighth graders, another objective of 
Experiment 1 was to determine whether these differences were more quantitative or more 
qualitative in nature. 
Performance differences would be quantitative to the extent that the performance 
profiles of gifted youth across the different task conditions were different from that of same-
age average-ability individuals but similar to those of older individuals. Performance 
differences would be qualitative to the extent that the performance profiles of gifted youth 
were different from both the performance profiles of same-age average-ability individuals and 
the performance profiles of older individuals. Quantitative performance differences would 
suggest that gifted youth go through the same developmental stages as do average-ability 
individuals; however, the gifted youth go through these developmental stages at a faster rate 
than do average-ability individuals, at least with respect to the abilities tapped by the 
experimental tasks. On the other hand, qualitative performance differences would suggest 
that the developmental stages that gifted youth go through, at least with respect to the abilities 
tapped by the experimental tasks, are different fi-om the stages that average-ability individuals 
go through. 
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Rates of Automatization Purine Training 
Although accuracy scores and response times were obtained and analyzed in 
Experiment 1, these were not used to measure the rate of automatization during training. 
Rather, measures of rate of automatization were obtuned by linearly regressing response 
times on the digits of the equations. The slopes obtained from these linear regressions 
document the shift from algorithm use to memory retrieval, whereas accuracy scores and 
response times do not. Moreover, slopes may be less influenced by other performance 
factors, such as fatigue, concentration, and motivation, than accuracy scores and response 
times. 
As mentioned earlier, it was assumed that participants were counting if it took them 
longer to respond to equations with larger digits than to equations with smaller digits. It was 
assumed that participants were remembering their previous responses if they responded to 
equations with larger digits just as quickly as they did to equations with smaller digits. Thus, 
when response times were linearly regressed on the digits of the equations, a relatively steep 
regression slope would reflect counting, or algorithm use, whereas a relatively flat regression 
slope would reflect remembering, or memory retrieval (Compton & Logan, 1991; Klapp et al., 
1991; Logan & Klapp, 1991). 
A slope of zero at the end of training would be the strongest evidence for the shift 
from algorithm use to memory retrieval, because it would suggest that at the end of training, 
response times no longer increased when the magnitude of the digits increased. In Experiment 
1, however, the values for slope seemed to reach asymptote at a value greater than zero. 
Throughout the ten training blocks (a total of 360 trials), the slope of the gifted group 
61 
decreased from 712 to 188 ms per di^t; the slope of the college group decreased from 594 to 
108 ms per di^t; and, the slope of the grade 7/8 group decreased from 802 to 324 ms per 
digit. Even if training were of a much longer duration, the slope would still asymptote at a 
value greater than zero. This also was the case in Logan and Klapp (1991, Experiment 1) in 
which participants trained on alphabet arithmetic over 12 480-trial sessions. At the end of the 
12th session, the slope was not zero, but was 45 ms per digit. 
It is possible, therefore, that the slopes obtained when response times are linearly 
regressed on the digits of the equations do not reflect memory retrieval alone, but also reflect 
some other processes that vary with the magnitude of the digits. The existence of such 
processes has been found in arithmetic-fact retrieval among children and aduhs. A prevalent 
effect in studies on arithmetic-fact retrieval, for instance, is that basic arithmetic facts Avith 
larger numbers are more difficult to retrieve than are basic arithmetic facts with smaller 
numbers (Ashcrafl, 1992). Because the slopes c?n be greater than zero even if memory 
retrieval has been used, then the strongest empirically obtained evidence for the shift from 
algorithm use to memory retrieval is not a slope of zero at the end of training but, rather, a 
decreasing pattern in slopes that reaches an asymptote in the course of training (Compton & 
Logan, 1991; Klapp et al., 1991; Logan & Klapp, 1991). 
In Experiment 1, slopes became flatter and reached an asymptotic value as training 
proceeded, indicating that automatization occurred during training. The grade 7/8 group had 
consistently higher slopes than the gifted or college groups. This suggests that the slopes of 
the grade 7/8 group were influenced to a larger extent by processes, other than algorithm use 
and memory retrieval, than were the slopes of the gifted and college groups. Although the 
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grade 7/8 group had consistently higher slopes than the ^ ed and college groups, there was 
no evidence that the grade 7/8 group was less capable of automatization than were the gifted 
and college groups. The absence of a reliable Group X Block interaction effect on slope 
suggests that the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups exhibited parallel shifts from counting 
algorithms to memory retrieval during training. In particular, the shift from counting 
algorithms to memory retrieval was just as fast in the grade 7/8 group as in the gifted and 
college groups. Thus, from these analyses of training slopes, it can be concluded that the 
gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups were comparable in their abilities for automatization. 
Therefore, the ability for automatization, at least as measured by the instance theory, is not a 
component of intellectual giftedness. 
Performance Profiles During Training 
Because the accuracy scores of the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups did not 
deteriorate as training proceeded, it is possible to make meaningful interpretations of the 
group, block, and Group X Block interaction effects on response time and slope. 
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that the training performance levels of the gifted 
group, in terms of accuracy (in some blocks), response time, and slope, were higher than 
those of the grade 7/8 group and comparable to those of the college group. In general, during 
training, the three groups of participants had parallel accuracy profiles, parallel response-time 
profiles, and parallel slope profiles. For all groups, slopes became flatter and response times 
became faster as training proceeded, and these changes occurred without accuracy changing 
much throughout training. The decreasing pattern in response time may be due, in part, to 
practice effects. It may, however, serve as additional evidence for the shift from counting 
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algorithms to memory retrieval. It is possible that response times at the start of training were 
relatively slow, because algorithm use is a relatively slow process and that response times 
toward the end of training were relatively fast, because memory retrieval is a relatively fast 
process. The fact that accuracy did not change much throughout training suggests that the 
decreasing patterns m response times was not the result of speed-accuracy trade-off. 
During training, the accuracy profile of the grade 7/8 group was flat, except that 
accuracy scores decreased from blocks two through three and from blocks eight through nine 
(see Figure 1). Also, the slope profile of the grade 7/S group showed a continuously 
decreasing trend, except that slopes increased from blocks two through four (see Figure S). It 
is not immediately apparent that these decreases in accuracy scores and increases in slopes 
were systematic. It is possible that these noticeable deviations are just a result of a smaller 
sample size (n = 18) for the grade 7/8 group as compared to the gifled (n = 43) and college (n 
= 44) groups. 
Also during training, the grade 7/8 group was able to speed up their responses to a 
greater extent than were the gifled and college groups. This result suggests that the slower 
one's responses are to begin with, the easier it is to speed these up. The grade 7/8 group 
started training with slower response times than did the gifted and college groups; hence, 
there was a larger range over which their response times could decrease. Given that choice 
response times have a minimum value of about 300 ms (Hyman, 1953), it was not possible for 
the gifted and college groups to speed up their responses to the same extent as could the 
grade 7/8 group. Thus the larger decrease in response times for the grade 7/8 group is not 
indicative of better performance. 
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To summarize, the analyses of slopes indicate that the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 
groups did not differ, even in a quantitative manner, in the ability for automatization. There 
were some differences in performance levels, however: the grade 7/8 group had lower 
accuracy (in some blocks), slower response times, and steeper slopes than the gifted and 
college groups. Although there was a larger speed-up ui performance in the grade 7/8 group 
than in the gifted and college groups, there was no strong evidence that the performance 
profiles of the three groups differed. It can be concluded, therefore, that whenever there were 
performance differences in training between the grade 7/8 group and the gifted and college 
groups, these differences were quantitative and not qualitative in nature. That is, the gifted 
and college groups were performing at a higher level than was the grade 7/8 group, but the 
three groups had parallel performance profiles. 
Response to Noveltv and Performance Profiles During Transfer 
In Experiment 1, the alphabet-arithmetic equations presented during transfer had not 
been previously learned or mastered by the participants during training. These equations 
could therefore be regarded as novel stimuli and transfer performance could then be used as 
an indicator of the ability to respond to novelty. Conclusions derived from the analyses of 
transfer performance are listed below and are discussed one by one. 
First, the slope for retest was comparable to the slope for final training. The fact that 
slopes for retest and fmal training were comparable suggests that the traces that accumulated 
in memory during training could still be retrieved at the end of transfer. Thus, the level of 
automatization achieved with the training stimuli was not hampered by working on novel 
stimuli during transfer. Another way of saying it is that the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 
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groups maintained at the end of transfer the level of automatization that they had achieved 
during training. Because traces of the traimng stimuli could still be retrieved at the end of 
transfer, it is very possible that they could be retrieved during transfer as well. Thus, the 
traces needed in order to respond effectively to the novel stimuli during transfer were available 
to the participants. 
Second, performance levels during retest were somewhat comparable to performance 
levels during final training. Although responses for retest were faster than responses for final 
training, they also were less accurate. It should be noted that retest performance may reflect 
the impact of transfer performance on the level of automatization that was achieved during 
training. However, because Experiment 1 was a single-session 450-trial experiment, it may be 
more likely that retest performance reflects the participants' increasing fatigue and decreasing 
interest toward the end of the experiment. That is, the lower accuracy scores and faster 
response times for retest as compared to those for final training more likely reflect the 
participants' fatigue or loss of interest rather than a decrease in the level of learning. 
Third, transfer performance levels of the gifted group, in terms of accuracy and 
response time, were higher than those of the grade 7/8 group and comparable to those of the 
college group. In terms of slope, however, the performance level of the grade 7/8 group was 
not reliably different from those of the gifted and college groups, suggesting that all groups 
showed comparable amounts of counting during the final training block, retest block, and 
transfer blocks. 
Fourth, the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups exhibited parallel performance 
profiles across the final training block, retest block, and transfer blocks. This was suggested 
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by the absence of reliable Group X Type of Block interaction efifects on accuracy, response 
time, and slope. There are two patterns that must be noted about the parallel performance 
profiles of the three groups. The first pattern is that: Whenever slopes decreased fi:om the 
final trjuning block to a transfer block, this decrease occurred in all groups; whenever slopes 
did not change fi-om the final training block to a transfer block, this absence of change was 
evident in all groups. Thus, if the ability to respond to novelty were assessed in terms of rate 
of automatization, then it can be concluded that, as was the case during training, the gifted, 
college, and grade 7/8 groups were comparable in their abilities for automatization. Whenever 
the gifted and college groups could maintain automatization during a shift to novel stimuli, the 
grade 7/8 group could do the same. 
The second pattern to be noted in the parallel performance profiles of the three groups 
is that: The order of difficulty of the different types of transfer, in terms of accuracy, response 
time, and slope, was similar in the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups. That is, what was the 
easiest type of transfer for one group also was the easiest type of transfer for the other groups; 
what was the most difficult type of transfer for one group also was the most difficult type of 
transfer for the other groups. 
Together the above conclusions indicate that whenever the grade 7/8 group differed 
from the gifted and college groups in the ability to respond to novelty, these differences were 
quantitative and not qualitative in nature. That is, the gifted and college groups were 
performing at a higher level than was the grade 7/8 group, but the three groups had parallel 
performance profiles. 
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Instance-based and Process-based Transfer 
Another objective of Experiment 1 was to determine, in the context of the alphabet-
arithmetic task, whether one type of instance-based transfer would be more successful than 
other types, and whether instance-based transfer would be more successful than process-based 
transfer. In Experiment 1, transfer stimuli differed in the degree to which they were similar to 
the training stimuli. Three of the four types of transfer stimuli (commutativity, reflexivity, and 
subtraction) tested for instance-based transfer. These three types of transfer stimuli contained 
the same letters and digits as the corresponding training equation, as well as the same relations 
among the letters and digits. The letters and digits, however, were presented in formats 
different from the format used in training. 
The add-one type of transfer stimuli tested for process-based transfer. Transfer stimuli 
of this type were different from the training stimuli and could not be answered by simply 
retrieving traces that accumulated in memory during training. To illustrate once again, to 
verify C + 3 = F, it was not enough to retrieve a trace of the corresponding training equation 
C + 2 = E. After retrieving this trace, it was also necessary to do one more count from E to 
obtain F. In this case, linearly regressing response times on digits of the equations would 
result in relatively flat slopes. Alternatively, C + 3 = F could be verified by doing three counts 
from C. In this case, linearly regressing response times on digits of the equations would result 
in relatively steep slopes. In either case, memory retrieval of C + 2 = E would not directly 
transfer to memory retrieval of C + 3 = F. 
68 
Comparisons Amon|g the Different Types of Instance-based Transfer 
As expired in the overview of Experiment 1, it was assumed that among the three 
types of instance-based transfer, commutativity and reflexivity had formats that were more 
similar to the training format, and subtraction had a format that was less similar to the trainmg 
format. Commutativity involved only a reversal of the letter-addend and digit-addend. Also, 
reflexivity involved only a reversal of the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the 
equation. Subtraction, on the other hand, involved a reformulation of the addition equation as 
a subtraction equation. Based on this reasoning, the easier transfer tasks would be 
commutativity and reflexivity, and the more difficult would be subtraction. This order of 
difficulty, however, was not apparent in Experiment 1. 
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that the slopes for commutativity, reflexivity, and 
subtraction were comparable to the slope for final training. This indicates that the process of 
automatization that was occurring during training continued to occur during the shifl to 
commutativity, reflexivity, and subtraction. This result implies that although the training 
stimuli were presented in different formats in the three types of instance-based transfer, these 
differences in format did not make one type of instance-based transfer easier than the other 
types (at least, in terms of slope). Thus, it can be concluded that differences in format do not 
determine the extent to which automatization (i.e., successful memory retrieval) can be 
exhibited during transfer (a) so long as the pertinent elements of the traces (i.e., the digit-
addend, letter-addend, sum) are all contained in the transfer stimuli, and (b) so long as the 
formats in which the transfer stimuli are presented are understandable to the learner; that is, so 
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long as the formats conform with the arithmetic relationships that are contained in the larger 
and more automatized set of basic arithmetic facts. 
Comparisons among the different types of transfer (in terms of slope) do not provide 
clear-cut conclusions about which transfer type is easier and which transfer type is more 
difScult. The comparisons indicate that, numerically, the flattest slope was obtained for 
subtraction, the next flattest slope was obtained for reflexivity, and the steepest slope was 
obtained for commutativity. The slope for reflexivity was not reliably different from the slope 
for subtraction, but neither was it reliably different from the slope for commutativity. 
Subtraction and commutativity, however, had reliably different slopes. Although the Group X 
Type of Block interaction effect was not reliable, these differences in slopes seem to be due to 
a steeper slope in the grade 7/8 group for conunutativity relative to those for the other types 
of instance-based transfer (See Figure 8). As was possibly the case in the accuracy and 
response times deviations in the grade 7/8 group during training, this deviation in slope could 
be the result of a smaller sample size for the grade 7/8 group as compared to sample sizes for 
the gifted and college groups. It also could be, however, that the grade 7/8 group found 
commutativity more difficult than the other types of instance-based transfer, although it is not 
immediately clear why this would be the case. 
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that, in terms of accuracy and response time, 
commutativity and subtraction were comparable in difficulty and both were easier than 
reflexivity. The main evidence for this conclusion was that responses to commutativity and 
subtraction were comparable in terms of accuracy and response time; responses to reflexivity. 
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however, were slower and less accurate than were responses to commutativity and 
subtraction. 
It is not clear why reflexivity was more di£Bcult than either commutati\ity or 
subtraction. The different types of instance-based transfer were chosen so that they vary 
according to theu* physical similarity to the training stimuli. Physically, it seemed that the 
reflexivity equations were not anymore different from the truning equations than were the 
commutativity equations, since both equations involved a reordering of digits and letters. 
Physically, it also seemed that the reflexivity equations were more similar to the training 
equations than were the subtraction equations, since both the training and reflexivity equations 
involved addition whereas the subtraction equations involved subtraction. 
Based on the performance of the participants, however, it seemed that the reflexivity 
equations were more difficult than both the commutativity and subtraction equations. 
Assuming that participants worked through equations from left to right, it seemed that 
processing the operation and operands before the result of the operation, as was the case in 
commutativity and subtraction, was psychologically easier than processing the result of the 
operation before the operation and the operands, as was the case in reflexivity. Thus, 
similarity of traces may be determined not only by physical similarity but also by some 
psychological similarity. 
The results of Experiment 1, however, do not always show that reflexivity was more 
difficult than commutativity and subtraction. The accuracy score for reflexivity was lower 
than the accuracy score for final training, but this was the case too for commutativity; 
moreover, the accuracy score for subtraction was higher than the accuracy score for final 
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truning. The response time for reflexivity was slower than the response time for final training, 
but this was the case too for subtraction; moreover, the response time for commutativity was 
faster than the response time for the final training block. 
The above comparisons among the different types of transfer (in terms of accuracy and 
response time) do not provide clear-cut and consistent conclusions about the order of 
difficulty among the different types of transfer. Nevertheless, the above comparisons do seem 
to suggest that format differences influence the accuracy and speed of responses during 
transfer. Two points are not clear, however. First, in what manner do format differences 
influence the accuracy and speed of responses during transfer? Second, why would format 
differences not influence the automatization exhibited during transfer, but would influence the 
accuracy and speed of responses during transfer? The instance theory of automaticity does 
not provide clear-cut answers to these questions. Answers to the these questions, however, 
might lead to a well-developed characterization of the long-term memory network for 
arithmetic facts and arithmetic knowledge. For example, it is possible that accuracy and 
response time differences that resulted from format difference are indicative of the varying 
strengths in which the properties of arithmetic operations are incorporated in the network. It 
also is possible that these varying strengths of incorporation into the network have an effect 
on some measures of performance but not on other measures of performance. 
Instance-based Versus Process-based Transfer 
Although the instance theory of automaticity does not make predictions about 
differences among different types of instance-based transfer, it does predict that the repeated 
presentation of stimuli during training will facilitate instance-based transfer but v^ll not 
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facilitate process-based transfer. Comparisons between instance-based transfer and process-
based transfer in Experiment 1 support this prediction of the instance theory. 
These comparisons indicate that responses to add-one equations were slower and less 
accurate than were responses to commutativity, reflexivity, and subtraction equations. 
Moreover, although slopes for commutativity, reflexivity, and subtraction blocks were 
comparable to the slope for the final training block, the slope for the add-one block was 
steeper than the slope for the final training block. This suggests that the process of 
automatization that was occurring during training continued to occur during the shift to 
commutativity, reflexivity, and subtraction. This process of automatization, however, did not 
appear to continue during the shift to add-one. 
It should be noted that the results of Experiment 1 do not always show that the three 
types of instance-based transfer were more successful than process-based transfer. The 
accuracy score for add-one was lower than the accuracy score for final training, but this was 
the case too for commutativity and reflexivity. Also, the response time for add-one was 
slower than the response time for final training, but this was the case too for subtraction and 
reflexivity. Moreover, the slope for add-one was not reliably different fi"om the slopes for 
commutativity and reflexivity. These results suggest that process-based transfer was at most 
as successful as, and not more successful than, instance-based transfer. 
The above comparisons between instance-based and process-based transfer pro\dde 
support for the instance theory of automaticity. That process-based transfer was, in general, 
less successful than instance-based transfer indicates that memory retrieval is the process that 
is largely responsible for success in transfer. As mentioned in the earlier discussion of the 
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instance theory of automaticity, memoiy retrieval during transfer is made possible by the 
accumulation of traces in memory as a result of training. Although such training may also 
increase the efficiency with which algorithms are carried out, the use of increasingly efficient 
algorithms does not determine success in transfer more than memory retrieval does. For if 
this were so, then process-based transfer would have been more successful than instance-
based transfer in the alphabet-arithmetic task. 
It should be emphasized that the main evidence for the conclusion that instance-based 
transfer was more successful than process-based transfer was that slopes for commutativity, 
reflexivity, and subtraction blocks were comparable to the slope for the final training block, 
but the slope for the add-one block was steeper than the slope for the final training block. 
Although accuracy scores and response times were obtained and analyzed in Experiment 1, 
these were not used to measure rate of automatization. Rather, measures of rate of 
automatization were obtained by linearly regressing response times on the di^ts of the 
equations. The slopes resulting fi'om the linear regressions document the shift from algorithm 
use to memory retrieval, whereas accuracy scores and response times do not. Moreover, 
slopes may be less influenced by other performance factors, such as fatigue, concentration, 
and motivation, than may accuracy scores and response times. 
The Group X Type of Block interaction effect on slope was not reliable and accounted 
for only 2.84% of the total variance. It should be noted, however, that the increase in slope 
from the final training block to the add-one block was veiy pronounced in the grade 7/8 group 
and was not very apparent in the gifted and college groups (See Figure 8). Comparisons of 
slopes for final training and add-one were conducted. The LSDs between two slopes within a 
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group were 109,108, and 169, respectively, for the gifted, college, and grade 7/8 groups, df= 
510. These comparisons indicate that the slope for add-one was reliably steeper than the 
slope for final training in the grade 7/8 group (effect size = 2.39; power = 0.95). In the ^ed 
and college groups, however, these slopes were not reliably different (effect size = 0.03 and 
0.06, respectively, for the gifted and college groups). Because the results of these pairwise 
comparisons were not supported by a reliable Group X Type of Block interaction effect, they 
should be taken only as tentative findings. Nevertheless, these tentative results still indicate 
quantitative performance differences between the gifted and grade 7/8 groups. In particular, 
these tentative results suggest that process-based transfer may be as successful as instance-
based transfer in the gifted and college groups, but not so in the grade 7/8 group. The fact 
that the the gifted and college groups had parallel performance profiles may suggest that 
individuals all go through a developmental shift from one mode of transfer (instance-based 
only) to two modes of transfer (instance-based and process-based). 
Process-based Transfer Revisited 
That process-based transfer could be as successful as instance-based transfer, at least 
in the gifted and college groups, warrants further research. The types of transfer included in 
Experiment 1 were relatively diSicult. Without receiving specific advice, research participants 
had to retrieve certain arithmetic relationships from their long-term memory network of 
number arithmetic. They then had to apply these relationships to a newly formed, although 
analogous, long-term memory network of alphabet arithmetic. Add-one equations were 
particularly difficult to handle, because the participants had to retrieve the pertinent arithmetic 
relationship, as well as retrieve the pertinent traces, before they could apply the arithmetic 
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relationship to these traces. Thus, it would have been eaaer, at least for some participants and 
for some of the equations, to just employ a straightforward counting algorithm. For example, 
it appeared that the grade 7/8 group reverted to counting during transfer to add-one as 
evident in the steeper slopes during add-one relative to the slopes during final training. On the 
other hand, the gifted and college groups continued to resort to memory retrieval during 
transfer to add-one as evident in comparable slopes for add-one and final training. 
People do not typically associate a counting algorithm with the alphabet. Rather, what 
is more closely associated with the alphabet is a reciting algorithm that takes into account only 
the order of letters and not the "magnitude" of letters in the alphabet. Thus, in the alphabet-
arithmetic task of Experiment 1, it appeared difficult to facilitate process-based transfer by 
merely presenting during training the stimuli that would appear during transfer. Although it 
may be possible to facilitate process-based transfer this way, it would probably entui training 
over several multitrial sessions. 
It is possible that when an algorithm is more closely associated with the task stimuli, 
then the repeated presentation of stimuli during training could facilitate, in a relatively short 
period of time, not only instance-based transfer but process-based transfer as well. This 
hypothesis was tested in Experiment 2 by employing a magnitude comparison task. 
Magnitude comparison is an algorithm that people likely employed with numbers while 
learning arithmetic facts (e.g., Is 15 less than 21?). It can be assumed that information about 
the ordering of numbers, as well as their magnitudes, are well incorporated into the traces of 
numbers in memory and that magnitude comparison with numbers is a relatively easy 
algorithm to apply. The same can be said, although to a much lesser extent, about magnitude 
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comparison with objects (e.g.. Is a tree smaller than a dog?). Although sizes of objects are 
not as well incorporated into their traces as are magnitudes of numbers, people are sometimes 
called upon to make judgments about sizes of objects. The objective of Experiment 2 was to 
determine whether process-based transfer can be successful when magnitude comparison is 
applied to numbers and objects. Because magnitude comparison is more closely associated 
with numbers than with objects, it is predicted that there would be greater facilitation of 
process-based transfer with numbers than with objects. That is with numbers, the repeated 
presentation of stimuli during training could facilitate not only instance-based transfer but 
process-based transfer as well. With objects, on the other hand, process-based transfer would 
not be as successful as instance-based transfer. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Overview of Experiment 2 
Number-comparison and Obiect-comparison Tasks 
Training and Transfer Stimuli Used in Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, research participants trained on number comparisons and object 
comparisons (e.g., 21 < 24; COIN smaller than MOUSE) in a fixed-pairs design. In a fixed-
pairs design, each item is paired with only one or two other items in the item pool, and these 
pairs are presented repeatedly. It is assumed that participants use a magnitude-comparison 
algorithm during initial trials, and then simply remember their responses to the different 
comparisons during subsequent trials (Foltz, Poltrock, & Potts, 1984). 
In the number-comparison task, participants verified whether inequalities such as *21 < 
24" were true or false. In the object-comparison task, participants verified whether 
comparisons such as "COIN smaller than MOUSE" were true or false. Intuitively, the 
number-comparison task is easier than the object-comparison task. This intuition is supported 
by models of magnitude comparisons, as well as by data showing that the number-comparison 
task can be performed faster and more accurately than can the object-comparison task (Foltz 
et al, 1984; Holyoak, 1977; Parkman, 1971). Numbers, as quantitative symbols, possess 
some inherent ordering, whereas objects, as quantitative symbols, do not (Klahr, 1971). That 
is, prior to training on comparison tasks, information about the relative magnitudes of 
numbers has been well incorporated into traces of numbers in memory. The prior existence of 
this information in memory makes for a fast transition fi-om magnitude-comparison algorithm 
to memory retrieval. On the other hand, information about the relative magnitudes of objects 
78 
may not have been well incorporated into their traces prior to training, resulting in a slower 
transition from magnitude-comparison algorithm to memory retrieval. Thus, not only can the 
number-comparison task be performed faster and more accurately than the object-comparison 
task, it can also be more easily automatized than the object-comparison task. 
Because the relative magnitudes of numbers are incorporated into theu* traces much 
better than are the relative magnitudes of objects, then research participants can associate the 
magnitude-comparison algorithm more closely with numbers than A^th objects. As mentioned 
earlier, it is possible than when an algorithm is more closely associated with the task stimuli, 
then the repeated presentation of stimuli during trdning could facilitate not only instance-
based transfer, but process-based transfer as well. Thus, it is predicted that there would be 
greater facilitation of process-based transfer with numbers than with objects. That is with 
numbers, the repeated presentation of stimuli during training could facilitate not only instance-
based transfer but process-based transfer as well. With objects, on the other hand, process-
based transfer would not be as successful as instance-based transfer. 
In Experiment 2, the transfer stimuli used in the number-comparison and object-
comparison tasks tested both for instance-based transfer and for process-based transfer. 
Stimuli that tested for instance-based transfer contmned the same numbers or objects as the 
training stimuli, but the relationship between the numbers or objects was stated differently 
during transfer. Stimuli that tested for process-based transfer contained numbers or objects 
that had never appeared during trmning, but the relationship between the numbers or objects 
was stated in the same form as in training. For example, the transfer comparisons "24 > 21" 
and "MOUSE larger than COIN" (called reversed comparisons), which corresponded to the 
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training comparisons "21 < 24' and 'COIN smaller than MOUSE*, tested for instance-based 
transfer. The process-based transfer comparisons *32 < 38' and 'SHOE smaller than BABY" 
(called new comparisons) contained terms ("32", "38", "SHOE", and "BABY") that had not 
appeared during training, although the type of comparison ("<" and "smaller than") remaned 
unchanged. 
Measuring Rate of Automatization Usinp the Power Law 
In the alphabet-arithmetic task of Experiment 1, the rate of automatization was 
measured by the differences in slopes of the lines obtained by regressing response times on the 
digits of the equations. Because this measure of rate of automatization is not applicable to the 
number- and object-comparison tasks of Experiment 2, it was necessary to employ another 
measure of rate of automatization. In Experiment 2, the rate of automatization was measured 
by the parameter c of the power law, which reflects the rate of response-time decrease in the 
course of performing a task. 
The instance theory is one of several theories that predict a slowing down of learning 
rate as automatization occurs (e.g., Anderson, 1982; Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981). As a task 
is performed repeatedly on the same set of stimuli, and as the shift fi'om algorithm use to 
memory retrieval occurs, the average response time decreases substantially during initial trials 
and decreases only gradually during later trials. Specifically, the average response time (RT) 
decreases as a power function of the number of trials or the number of blocks of trials (N): 
RT = a + bN"® (Logan, 1988b, 1992b). This equation, called the power law, conforms with 
data from several studies that considered the development of skills ranging from perceptual-
motor skills to complex problem-solving skills and provides a better fit than does other 
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families of curves (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981). The response time data of Experiment 1 
also illustrated the pattern described by the power law. 
Shown in the following figures are plots of the power law that have the same values 
for parameters b and c but different values for parameter a (Figure 9), the same values for a 
and c but different values for b (Figure 10), and the same values for a and b but different 
values for c figure 11). As illustrated in these figures, the shape of the power law plots is 
determined only by the parameter c and not by the parameters a and b. The parameters a and 
b are just scaling parameters that situate the plot in a specific range of values (Logan, 1992b). 
In particular, the parameter a is the limiting value of RT for an infinite number of blocks of 
trials N. That is, the parameter a reflects the asymptote of the curve. The parameter b is the 
amount by which initial completion time is decreased to the limiting value of RT (i.e., to the 
value of the parameter a). The meaning of the parameter b can be seen by taking N to be 
equal to one and RT to be equal to the RT during the first block of trials [RT(1)] and then 
considering the resulting equation b = RT(1) - a. 
The parameter c reflects how steeply the curve descents. Figure 11 illustrates that the 
lower the value of c, the more gradual is the task speed-up. The more gradual the task speed­
up, the slower is the shift fi^om algorithm use to memory retrieval. Thus, the lower the value 
of c, the slower is task automatization and the higher the value of c, the faster is task 
automatization. 
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Figure 11 Plots of the power law having the same values for parameters a and b but different values for parameter c 
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Objectives of Experiment 2 
Measures of Performance Obtained in Experiment 2 
Measures of accuracy, response time, and rate of automatization were used to 
determine success (a) of training, (b) of instance-based transfer, and (c) of process-based 
transfer in both number- and object-comparison tasks. For each participant, the power law 
was fitted to response-time data (a) for training, (b) for instance-based transfer, and (c) for 
process-based transfer for both number and object comparisons. In Experiment 1, there were 
fewer blocks of trials for each type of transfer (1 block per transfer task) than there were for 
training (10 blocks). In order to fit the power law to response-time data for transfer, and not 
just for training, it was necessary to increase the number of blocks for transfer. Thus, in 
Experiment 2 the training comparisons, reversed comparisons, and new comparisons were 
each presented in ten blocks. 
Instance-based Transfer and Process-based Transfer 
As mentioned earlier, the objective of Experiment 2 was to determine whether 
process-based transfer would be as successfiil as instance-based transfer in the number- and 
object-comparison tasks. It was hypothesized that if an algorithm is closely associated with 
the task stimuli, as magnitude comparison is with numbers and objects, then the repeated 
presentation of stimuli during training can facilitate not only instance-based transfer, but 
process-based transfer as well. 
In Experiment 2, it was assumed that the shift firom the training to the reversed stage 
would exemplify instance-based transfer, and that the shift fi-om the reversed to the new stage 
would exemplify process-based transfer. Instance-based transfer was considered as successful 
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as long as performance (in terms of accuracy, response time, and rate of automatization) did 
not deteriorate during the shift from the truning to the reversed stage. Likewise, process-
based transfer was considered as successful as long as performance did not deteriorate during 
the shift fi'om the reversed to the new stage. 
Ability Differences Between the Gifted and College Groups 
The results of Experiment 1 consistently showed quantitative ability differences 
between the gifted and grade 7/8 groups, but did not show any ability differences between the 
gifted and college groups. At this point then, the more interesting comparison to make is that 
between the gifted and college groups. The fact that older individuals are a more appropriate 
comparison group for gifted youth than are same-age average-ability individuals has been 
suggested by other studies (e.g., Dark & Benbow, 1990; Stanley & Benbow, 1986). A 
secondary objective of Experiment 2 was to determine whether in the number- and object-
comparison tasks, gifted youth would be precocious or whether some ability differences 
would exist between gifted youth and individuals several years older than they are. Thus, the 
samples of participants in Experiment 2 included gifted seventh and eighth graders and college 
students, but did not include average-ability seventh and eighth graders. (Another reason for 
excluding average-ability seventh and eighth graders in Experiment 2 was that they did not 
exhibit process-based transfer in Experiment 1 as apparently did the gifted seventh and eighth 
graders and college students.) 
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Method 
Participants 
Gifted Youth 
Forty-three intellectually gifted youth participated in this experiment and were paid 
$5.00 each for participation. Parental permission for participation in the experiment was 
obtained. There were 29 males and 14 females. This sample of gifted youth was different 
from that in Experiment 1 but came from the same population. 
For this sample of gifted youth, the mean SAT score for the mathematics section was 
592 fSD = 99); the mean for the verbal section was 472 (SD = 90); and the mean for the 
composite was 1064 (SD = 141). These scores were higher than the 51st percentiles among 
college-bound high school seniors. 
College Students 
Forty-three college students who were enrolled in introductory psychology courses 
voluntarily participated in this experiment and received extra credit for participation. There 
were 12 males and 31 females. This sample of college students was different from that in 
Experiment 1 but came from the same population. 
For this sample of college students, the mean ACT score for the mathematics section 
was 25 (SD = 5); the mean for the English section was 26 (SD = 4); the mean for the reading 
section was 27 (SD = 6); and the mean for the composite was 26 (SD = 4). These scores 
were higher than the 1994 national norms. The college participants' mean ACT composite 
score of 26 was roughly equivalent to an SAT composite score of 1070 to 1100 (Educational 
Testing Service; as cited in ISU, 1995). Thus, the college participants' mean ACT composite 
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score of 26 was roughly equivalent to the gifted-youth participants' mean SAT compodte 
score of 1064. 
Stimuli 
Number Comparisons 
Two sets of number comparisons were constructed and were assigned randomly 
across participants. There were approximately the same number of participants assigned to 
each set. All number comparisons involved two-digit numbers only. Each set of training 
comparisons consisted of the following: (a) six less-than inequalities using numbers in the 
same decade; three of these were true inequalities, and the other three were false inequalities, 
and (b) six less-than inequalities using numbers in different decades; three of these were true 
inequalities and the other three were false inequalities. The two sets of number comparisons 
used in Experiment 2 are shown in Table 14. 
From each of the 12 training comparisons in a set, two types of transfer comparisons 
were generated through the following procedure; For reversed transfer comparisons, the less-
than sign was changed to a greater-than sign and the order of digits was reversed. There were 
then six true and six false reversed transfer comparisons. For new transfer comparisons; As 
mentioned earlier, two sets of training comparisons were constructed and one of these sets 
was randomly assigned to each participant. The new transfer comparisons for each participant 
consisted of the training comparisons in the set that was not assigned to the participant. 
Object Comparisons 
Two sets of object comparisons were constructed and were assigned randomly across 
participants. There were approximately the same number of participants assigned to each set. 
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Table 14 
Training and Transfer Number Comparisons 
Set 1 True 
Comparisons 
False 
Comparisons 
Numbers in the same decade 
Training stage 
91<95 
95 <96 
96 <98 
Numbers in different decades 
19<21 
21 <74 
74 <81 
95 <91 
96 <95 
98 <96 
21 <19 
74 <21 
81 <74 
Numbers in the same decade 
Reversed stage 
95 >91 
96 >95 
98 >96 
Numbers in different decades 
21 >19 
74 >21 
81 >74 
91 >95 
95 >96 
96 >98 
19 >21 
21 >74 
74 >81 
Numbers in the same decade 
New stage 
20 <21 
25 <28 
28 <29 
Numbers in different decades 
11 <46 
46 <54 
54 <86 
21 <20 
28 <25 
29 <28 
46 <11 
54 <46 
86 <54 
Set 2 True 
Comparisons 
False 
Comparisons 
Numbers in the same decade 
Training stage 
20 <21 
25 <28 
28 <29 
Numbers in different decades 
11 <46 
46 <54 
54 <86 
21 <20 
28 <25 
29 <28 
46<11 
54 <46 
86 <54 
Numbers in the same decade 
Reversed stage 
21 >20 
28 >25 
29 >28 
Numbers in different decades 
46> 11 
54 >46 
86 >54 
20 >21 
25 >28 
28 >29 
11 >46 
46 >54 
54 >86 
Numbers in the same decade 
New stage 
91 <95 
95 <96 
96 <98 
Numbers in different decades 
19 <21 
21 <74 
74 <81 
95 <91 
96 <95 
98 <96 
21 <19 
74 <21 
81 <74 
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The words used in these object comparisons were obtained from Kucera and Francis's (1967) 
norms and contained approximately the same number of letters. There were sbc true and six 
false training comparisons in each set: (a) sbc comparisons of objects with small size 
discrepancies; three of these were true comparisons, and the other three were false 
comparisons, and (b) sbc comparisons of objects with large size discrepancies; three of these 
were true comparisons, and the other three were false comparisons. Whether a comparison 
involved a "small" size discrepancy or a "large" size discrepancy was determmed intuitively and 
relative to size discrepancies in other comparisons. The two sets of object comparisons used 
in Experiment 2 are shown in Table 15. 
From each of the 12 training comparisons in a set, two types of transfer comparisons 
were generated through the following procedure: For reversed transfer comparisons, "smaller 
than" was changed to "larger than" and the order of objects was reversed. There were then sbc 
true and six false reversed transfer comparisons. For new transfer comparisons: As 
mentioned earlier, two sets of training comparisons were constructed and one of these sets 
was randomly assigned to each participant. The new transfer comparisons for each participant 
consisted of the training comparisons in the set that was not assigned to the participant. 
Procedure 
All participants did both the number and object-comparison tasks. The order in which 
these two tasks were performed was determined randomly for each participant. 
Parallel experimental procedures were used for the number-comparison task and the 
object-comparison task. For each task, training comparisons were presented first, followed by 
reversed transfer comparisons, and then followed by new transfer comparisons. The set of 12 
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Table 15 
Training and Transfer Object Comparisons 
Setl True comparisons False comparisons 
Training 
stage 
Objects with NAIL smaller than EGG 
small size EGG smaller than CAMERA 
discrepancies CAMERA smaller than CAT 
EGG smaller than NAIL 
CAMERA smaller than EGG 
CAT smaller than CAMERA 
Objects with SEED smaller than JACKET 
large size JACKET smaller than PIANO 
discrepancies PIANO smaller than BUS 
JACKET smaller than SEED 
PIANO smaUer than JACKET 
BUS smaller than PIANO 
Reversed 
stage 
Objects with EGG larger than NAIL 
small size CAMERA larger than EGG 
discrepancies CAT larger than CAMERA 
Objects with JACKET larger than SEED 
large size PIANO larger than JACKET 
discrepancies BUS larger than PIANO 
NAIL larger than EGG 
EGG larger than CAMERA 
CAMERA larger than CAT 
SEED larger than JACKET 
JACKET larger than PIANO 
PIANO larger than BUS 
New 
stage 
Objects with COIN smaller than MOUSE 
small size MOUSE smaller than SHOE 
discrepancies SHOE smaller than BABY 
MOUSE smaller than COIN 
SHOE smaller than MOUSE 
BABY smaller than SHOE 
Objects with NEEDLE smaller than CHICKEN 
large size CHICKEN smaller than DESK 
discrepancies DESK smaller than FACTORY 
CHICKEN smaller than NEEDLE 
DESK smaller than CHICKEN 
FACTORY smaller than DESK 
Set 2 True comparisons False comparisons 
Training 
stage 
Objects with COIN smaller than MOUSE 
small size MOUSE smaller than SHOE 
discrepancies SHOE smaller than BABY 
MOUSE smaller than COIN 
SHOE smaller than MOUSE 
BABY smaller than SHOE 
Objects with NEEDLE smaller than CHICKEN 
large size CHICKEN smaller than DESK 
discrepancies DESK smaller than FACTORY 
CHICKEN smaller than NEEDLE 
DESK smaller than CHICKEN 
FACTORY smaller than DESK 
Reversed 
stage 
Objects with MOUSE larger than COIN 
small size SHOE larger than MOUSE 
discrepancies BABY larger than SHOE 
Objects with CHICKEN larger than NEEDLE 
large size DESK larger than CHICKEN 
discrepancies FACTORY larger than DESK 
COIN larger than MOUSE 
MOUSE larger than SHOE 
SHOE larger than BABY 
NEEDLE larger than CHICKEN 
CHICKEN larger than DESK 
DESK larger than FACTORY 
New 
stage 
Objects with NAIL smaller than EGG 
small size EGG smaller than CAMERA 
discrepancies CAMERA smaller than CAT 
EGG smaller than NAIL 
CAMERA smaller than EGG 
CAT smaller than CAMERA 
Objects with SEED smaller than JACKET 
large size JACKET smaller than PIANO 
discrepancies PIANO smaller than BUS 
JACKET smaller than SEED 
PIANO smaller than JACKET 
BUS smaller than PIANO 
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training comparisons, the set of 12 reversed comparisons, and the set of 12 new comparisons 
were each presented 10 times. The fifth of the 10 presentations of each type of comparisons 
was followed by a period of rest, which was terminated by the participant's pressing the space 
bar. Each of the ten presentations of the set of training comparisons, of the set of reversed 
comparisons, and of the set of new comparisons was preceded by a 1000-millisecond fixation 
marker. Comparisons remained on the computer screen until a response was made. A 1000-
miliisecond intertrial blank occurred between equations. Comparisons in a set appeared in a 
random and different order fi'om presentation to presentation. 
As in Experiment 1, participants read the equations and entered their responses on 
IBM-compatible 386 or 486 personal computers with color monitors. Each participant was 
assigned a computer and participants were tested in groups of three to ten. Instructions and 
tasks were programmed using the MicroExperimental Laboratory software package 
(Schneider, 1988). Participants were instructed to determine as quickly as possible whether 
each comparison was true or false while minimizing errors. The"?" key was used to enter a 
"true" response and the "z" key was used to enter a "false" response. "T" and "F" markers 
were placed, respectively, on the"?" and "z" keys. The feedback "Correct Response" or 
"Wrong Response" appeared on the monitor for 500 milliseconds immediately after each 
response. The feedback "Wrong Response" was accompanied by a feedback tone each time it 
appeared. 
Participants were told that the same set of comparisons would be presented repeatedly 
and that they should expect to get faster as training proceeded. For transfer comparisons, 
participants were informed that new sets of comparisons would be presented. Although the 
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relationships between training and transfer comparisons were not described to the participants, 
they were instructed to use, whenever possible, the truning comparisons in verifying transfer 
comparisons. All instructions were given via computer. 
Participants were appropriately debriefed after the experiment. Most participants took 
30 to 4S minutes to finish the entire experiment. 
Results 
For reasons described in Experiment 1, response times less than 150 ms or greater 
than 9000 ms and their corresponding accuracy scores were not included in the following 
statistical analyses. These deleted observations comprised less than one per cent of the entire 
data set. Only response times for correct responses were included in the analyses. 
Each participant's task performance was measured in terms of three dependent 
variables: mean accuracy score (reported as a proportion), mean response time (in ms), and 
rate of automatization (in terms of the parameter c of the power law). These three dependent 
measures were obtained for the following conditions: number-training, number-reversed, 
number-new, object-training, object-reversed, and object-new. Nonlinear least squares 
estimation was used to estimate the parameters a, b, and c of the power law from the 
response-time data of each participant in each of these conditions. About 90 per cent of the 
fits had a value for r^that was greater than or equal to .90. 
As mentioned eariier, the shape of the power law plots is determined only by the 
parameter c and not by the parameters a and b. The parameters a and b are just scaling 
parameters that situate the plot in a specific range of values. The parameter c, on the other 
hand, defines rate of automatization. Thus, only the values of the parameter c were included 
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in the analyses. Values ofthe parameter c typically range from zero to one. Values of the 
parameter c that were greater than three were trimmed down to a value of one; the trimmed 
values comprised less than one percent of the entire data set. 
A .05 level of significance was used in all statistical tests. If a pairwise comparison of 
means required a linear combination of mean squares as the error term, then the Cochran-
Satterthwaite (Snedecor & Cochran, 1989) formula was used to approximate degrees of 
freedom. 
The variables item set (set 1 vs. set 2 as training), order (number first vs. object first), 
truth (true comparisons vs. false comparisons), and gender (male vs. female) were not 
included in the statistical analyses reported below. Preliminaiy ANOVAs indicated that these 
variables did not interact reliably with the variables of main interest. The effects of item set 
and order on accuracy, response time, and rate of automatization were not reliable. The 
effects of truth on accuracy and response time were reliable, but the effect on rate of 
automatization was not. Dependent-samples t-tests indicated that true comparisons were 
responded to more accurately (M = 0.918,  ^= 0.044) than were false comparisons (M = 
0.898, SD = 0.061), t(85) = 5.49, ^ = 0.08. Also, true comparisons were responded to 
faster ^=1163 ms, ^  = 262) than were false comparisons (M = 1243 ms, SD = 288), t(85) 
= 10.68, SE = 48.10. The better performance with true responses than with false responses is 
a commonly found pattern. The effect of gender on accuracy was reliable, but its effects on 
response time and rate of automatization were not. An independent-samples t-test indicated 
that females had more accurate responses (M = 0.922, SD = 0.045) than males ^ = 0.893, 
SD = 0.052), t(85) = 2.73, SE = 0.04. 
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Three ANTOVAs were done, one for each of the dependent variables: accuracy, 
response time, and rate of automatization. In each AN^OVA, group (gifted vs. college) was a 
between-subjects variable, and type of stimulus (number vs. object) and stage (training vs. 
reversed vs. new) were within-subjects variables. 
Accuracy 
Stimulus Effect 
The stimulus effect on accuracy was reliable, F(l, 84) = 54.85, MSE = 0.004. 
Responses to number stimuli were more accurate than were responses to object stimuli. The 
mean accuracy scores for number and object stimuli were 0.928 (SE = 0.003) and 0.889 (SE 
= 0.004), respectively. 
Stage Effect 
The stage effect (training vs. reversed vs. new) on accuracy was reliable (F(2,168) = 
0.01, MSE = 0.001) and was qualified by a reliable Stimulus X Stage interaction effect. The 
mean accuracy scores for the training, reversed, and new stages were 0.909 (SE = 0.005), 
0.915 (SE = 0.005), and 0.901 (SE = 0.006), respectively. The stage effect is not discussed 
any further, because the Stimulus X Stage interaction effect more adequately reflects patterns 
in the data. 
Stimulus X Stage Interaction Effect 
As mentioned, the Stimulus X Stage interaction effect on accuracy was reliable, F(2, 
168) = 6.08, MSE = 0.001. Shown in Table 16 and plotted in Figure 12 are the mean 
accuracy scores for the training, reversed, and new stages for both number and object stimuli. 
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Table 16 
Accuracy Scores for Training, Reversed, and New Stages for Both Number and Object 
Stimuli 
Stage 
M 
Number 
SE 
Stimulus 
M 
Object 
SE 
Training 0.934* 0.005 0.884' 0.007 
Reversed 0.927* 0.006 0.902* 0.007 
New 0.936* 0.006 0.880' 0.009 
N01E: SupencripU indicate which lUget, for Mchitimului, had companble or reliably diffeientaccunicyicafcs. Thui, for object itimuli, 
accuracy scores for training and new comparisons were comparable (both are marked 2) and were reliably lower than for revened 
comparisons. 
u 0.91 
•Training 
•Reversed 
• New 
Number Object 
Stimulus 
Figure 12. Accuracy scores for training, reversed, and new comparisons for both number 
and object stimuli 
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To follow up on the reliable Stimulus X Stage interaction effect, mean accuracy scores 
for the traming, reversed, and new stages were compared for each type of stimulus. The LSD 
between accuracy scores for two stages was 0.010, approximate df = 333. For number 
stimuli, accuracy did not change reliably during the shift from the training to the reversed 
stage or during the shift from the reversed to the new stage. For object stimuli, on the other 
hand, accuracy increased reliably during the shift from the training to the reversed stage and 
decreased reliably to training level during the shift from the reversed to the new stage. 
Group Effect 
The group effect on accuracy was reliable, F(l, 84) = 46.27, MSE = 0.01. The gifted 
group had less accurate responses than the college group. The mean accuracy scores of the 
gifted and college groups were 0.878 (SD = 0.004) and 0.938 fSD = 0.002), respectively. 
Group X Stimulus Interaction Effect 
The Group X Stimulus interaction effect was reliable, F(l, 84) = 13.21, MSE = 0.004. 
Shown in Table 17 and plotted in Figure 13 are the mean accuracy scores of the gifted and 
college groups for number and object stimuli. 
To follow up on the reliable Group X Stimulus interaction effect, mean accuracy 
scores for number and object stimuli were compared for each group. The LSD between 
accuracy scores for the two types of stimuli was 0.010, approximate df = 136. For both gifted 
and college groups, the mean accuracy score for number stimuli was reliably higher than the 
mean accuracy score for object stimuli. The difference in mean accuracy scores, however, 
was larger in the gifted group (0.0S8) than in the college group (0.020). 
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Table 17 
Accuracy Scores of the Gifted and College Groups for Number and Object Stimuli 
Stimulus Group 
Gifted College 
M SE M SE 
Number 0.907' 0.005 0.948' 0.003 
Object 0.849^ 0.007 0.928^ 0.004 
NOTE;SupeiicripU indiMte which itimuli, for dch group, had companble or reliably different accuracy tcorei. 
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Figure 13. Accuracy scores of the gifted and college groups for number and object stimuli 
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Group X Stage Interaction Effect 
The Group X Stage interaction eflfect was reliable, F(2,168) = 3.91, MSE = 0.001. 
Shown in Table 18 and plotted in Figure 14 are the mean accuracy scores of the gifted and 
college groups for the training, reversed, and new stages. 
To follow up on the reliable Group X Stage interaction effect, mean accuracy scores 
for the training, reversed, and new stages were compared for each group. The LSD between 
accuracy scores for two stages was 0.007, approximate df = 101. For the gifted group, 
accuracy did not change reliably during the shift from the trmning to the reversed stage but 
decreased reliably during the shift from the reversed to the new stage. For the college group, 
on the other hand, accuracy did not change reliably either during the shift from the training to 
the reversed stage or during the shift firom the reversed to the new stage. 
Group X Stimulus X Stage Interaction Effect 
The Group X Stimulus X Stage interaction effect on accuracy was reliable, F(2,168) 
= 4.88, MSE = 0.001. Shown in Table 19 and plotted in Figure 15 are the mean accuracy 
scores of the gifted and college groups for the different stimulus-stage combinations. 
To follow up on the reliable Group X Stimulus X Stage interaction effect, mean 
accuracy scores for the training, reversed, and new stages were compared for each stimulus 
within each group. ResuUs of these comparisons, however, are not reported here because 
they do not show any marked deviation from the pattern of accuracy scores suggested by the 
Stimulus X Stage interaction effect. The source of the Group X Stimulus X Stage interaction 
effect was the decrease in accuracy in the gifted group during the shift from the reversed to 
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Table 18 
Accuracy Scores of the Gifted and College Groups for Training, Reversed, and New 
Stages 
Stage 
M 
Group 
Gifted 
SE M 
College 
SE 
Training 0.883' 0.007 0.936' 0.005 
Reversed 0.887' 0.007 0.942' 0.004 
New 0.866^ 0.009 0.936' 0.005 
NOTE; SupcncripU indicate which atago, for each group, had comparable or reliably different accuracy Korea. 
0.96 T 
• Training 
• Reversed 
• New 
Gifted College 
Group 
Figure 14. Accuracy sores of the gifted and college groups for training, reversed, and new 
stages 
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Table 19 
Accuracy Scores of the Gifted and College Groups for the Different Stimulus-Stage 
Combinations 
Stimulus Stage Group 
Gifted College 
M SE M SE 
Training 0.916* 0.007 0.952' 0.005 
Number Reversed 0.903' 0.009 0.950' 0.005 
New 0.903' 0.009 0.941' 0.006 
Trainmg 0.850' 0.011 0.920' 0.007 
Object Reversed 0.871' 0.011 0.934' 0.007 
New 0.828' 0.013 0.931' 0.007 
NOTE: SupencripU indicate which ttage, for each stimului and for each group, had comparable or reliably different accuracy Korei. 
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Figure 15. Accuracy scores of the gifted and college groups for the different stimulus-stage 
combinations 
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the new stage in the object stimuli; there was no corresponding decrease in accuracy in the 
college group (See Figure IS). 
Response Time 
Stimulus Effect 
The stimulus effect on response time was reliable, F(l, 84) = 373.50, MSE = 172,022. 
Responses to number stimuli were faster than were responses to object stimuli. The mean 
response times for number and object stimuli were 858 ms fSE= 14) and 1563 ms (SE= 29), 
respectively. Thus, there was no evidence of speed-accuracy tradeoff in how the two types of 
stimuli were processed, because responses to number stimuli were faster as well as more 
accurate than were responses to word stimuli. 
Stage Effect 
The stage effect on response time was reliable, jF(2, 168) = 81.98, MSE = 2,345,556, 
and was qualified by a reliable Stimulus X Stage interaction effect. The mean response times 
for the training, reversed, and new stages were 1342 ms (SE = 44), 1169 ms (SE = 35), and 
1120 ms (SE = 35), respectively. The stage effect is not discussed any further, because the 
Stimulus X Stage interaction effect more adequately reflects patterns in the data. 
Stimulus X Stage Interaction Effect 
As mentioned, the Stimulus X Stage interaction effect on response time was reliable, 
F(2,168) = 18.57, MSE = 24,833. Shown in Table 20 and plotted in Figure 16 are the mean 
response times for the training, reversed, and new stages for both number and object stimuli. 
To follow up on the reliable Stimulus X Stage interaction effect, mean response times 
for the training, reversed, and new stages were compared for each stimulus. The LSD 
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Table 20 
Response Times for Training, Reversed, and New Stages for Both Number and Object 
Stimuli 
Stage Stimulus 
Number Object 
M SE M SE 
Training 934' 31 1750^ 56 
Reversed 863' 22 1475* 46 
New 775' 19 1464* 44 
NOTE:Supeiicripta indicate which itagea, for each itiinulua, had eompaiable or reliably different rcipoaae timea 
1800 T 
•Training 
• Reversed 
• New 
Number Object 
Stimulus 
Figure 16. Response times for training, reversed, and new stages for both number and object 
stimuli 
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between response times for two stages was 49 ms, approximate df == 334. For number stimuli, 
response times became reliably faster during the shift from the training to the reversed stage as 
well as during the shift from the reversed to the new stage. For object stimuli, on the other 
hand, response times became reliably faster during the shift from the training to the reversed 
stage, but did not change reliably during the shift from the reversed to the new stage. Taken 
in conjunction with the corresponding pattern of accuracy scores, there was little evidence of 
speed-accuracy tradeoff in the stage effect. 
Group Effect 
The group effect on response time was not reliable, F(l, 84) = 1.33, MSE = 45,168. 
The mean response times of the gifted and college groups were 1176 ms (SE = 30) and 1244 
ms (SE = 33), respectively. The fact that the two groups did not differ on response time but 
did differ on accuracy suggests that the gifted group may have been emphasizing speed over 
accuracy to a higher degree than did the college group. 
Group X Stimulus. Group X Stage, and Group X Stimulus X Stage Interaction Effects 
The Group X Stimulus, Group X Stage, and Group X Stimulus X Stage interaction 
effects on response time were not reliable. The F-statistic for the Group X Stimulus 
interaction effect was F(l, 84) = 0.58, MSE = 172,022. The F-statistic for the Group X Stage 
interaction effect was F(2,168) = 0.91, MSE = 28,611. The F-statistic for the Group X 
Stimulus X Stage interaction effect was F(2,168) = 0.50, MSE = 24,832. 
The mean response times of the two groups for number and word stimuli are shown in 
Table 21 and plotted in Figure 17. The mean response times of the two groups for the 
training, reversed, and new stages are shown in Table 22 and plotted in Figure 18. The mean 
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Table 21 
Response Times of the Gifted and College Groups for Number and Object Stimuli 
Stimulus Group 
Gifted College 
M SE M SE 
Number 837 18 877 23 
Object yi5 39 16n 44 
1800 T 
1600 • • 
1400 • • 
1200 • • 
1000 • • 
& 800 • • 
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Figure 17. Response times of the gifted and college groups for number and object stimuli 
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Table 22 
Response Times of the CKfted and College Groups for Training, Reversed, and New Stages 
Stage Group 
Gifted College 
M SE M SE 
Training 1295 58 1389 69 
Reversed 1147 47 1192 52 
New 1087 50 1152 53 
1400 J 
1200 • • 
I 1000 
c • • BTraining 
§• DReversed 
& ONew 
re 
S 400 • -
200 
OHM Call«s* 
Group 
Figure 18. Response times of the gifted and college groups for training, reversed, and new 
stages 
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response times of the two groups for the different stimulus-stage combinations are shown in 
Table 23 and plotted in Figure 19. The absence of reliable Group X Stimulus, Group X 
Stage, and Group X Stimulus X Stage interaction effects implies parallel performance profiles, 
with respect to response time, for the gifted and college groups across difiTerent stages and 
different stimuli. Such parallel performance profiles are evident in Figures 17,18, and 19. 
Rate of Automatization 
Stimulus Effect 
The stimulus effect on rate of automatization (i.e., the parameter c of the power law) 
was reliable, F(l, 84) = 10.83, MSE = 0.27. Responses to number stimuli were more quickly 
automatized than were responses to object stimuli. The mean rates of automatization for 
number and object stimuli were 0.52 (SE = 0.04) and 0.37 (SE = 0.03), respectively. 
Stage Effect 
The stage effect on rate of automatization was reliable, F(2,168) = 3.44, MSE = 0.90, 
and was qualified by a reliable Stimulus X Stage interaction effect. The mean rates of 
automatization for the training, reversed, and new stages were 0.37 (SE = 0.04), 0.47 (SE = 
0.04), and 0.50 (^ = 0.04), respectively. The stage effect is not discussed any further, 
because the Stimulus X Stage interaction effect more adequately reflects patterns in the data. 
Stimulus X Stage Interaction Effect 
As mentioned, the Stimulus X Stage interaction effect on rate of automatization was 
reliable, F(2, 168) = 6.36, MSE = 0.30. Shown in Table 24 and plotted in Figure 20 are the 
mean rates of automatization for the training, reversed, and new stages for both number and 
object stimuli. 
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Table 23 
Response Times of the Gifted and College Groups for the Different Stimulus-Stage 
Combinations 
Stimulus Stage Group 
Gifted College 
M SE M SE 
Training 910 34 958 46 
Number Reversed 851 24 876 31 
New 750 21 799 28 
Training 1679 63 1821 79 
Object Reversed 1442 56 1508 63 
New 1424 57 1504 57 
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Figure 19. Response times of the gifted and college groups for the different stimulus-stage 
combinations 
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Table 24 
Rates of Automatization for Trdning, Reversed, and New Stages for Both Number and 
Object Stimuli 
Stage Stimulus 
Number Object 
M ^ M SE 
Training 0.49^* 0.06 0.25* 0.04 
Reversed 0.62' 0.07 0.33^ 0.05 
New 0.47' 0.06 0.55* 0.06 
NOTE: Supencript indicate which itagei, for each atimulua, had conquuable or reliably different rates of automatization. 
'For number itimuli, there wu only a marginally reliable difference between the rates of automatization for training and revened 
compariioni. 
0.7 T 
0 .6 - •  
•Training 
•Reversed 
• New 
Number Object 
Stimulus 
Figure 20. Rates of automatization for training, reversed, and new comparisons for number 
and object stimuli 
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To follow up on the reliable Stimulus X Stage interaction effect, the mean rates of 
automatization for the trunuig, reversed, and new stages were compared for each stimulus. 
The LSD between rates of automatization for two stages was 0.16, approximate df = 335. 
For number stimuli, rate of automatization increased by a marginally reliable amount (p =. 10) 
during the shift from the training to the reversed stage; rate of automatization, however, 
decreased reliably to the training level during the shift from the reversed to the new stage. For 
object stimuli, on the other hand, rate of automatization did not change reliably during the 
shift from the training to the reversed stage, but increased during the shift from the reversed to 
the new stage. 
Group Effect 
The group effect on rate of automatization was not reliable, F(l, 84) = 0.62, MSB = 
0.33, indicating that the gifted and college groups' rates of automatization did not differ. The 
mean rates of automatization of the gifted and college groups were 0.43 (SE = 0.03) and 0.47 
(SE = 0.03), respectively. 
Group X Stimulus. Group X Stage, and Group X Stimulus X Stage Interaction Effects 
The Group X Stimulus, Group X Stage, and Group X Stimulus X Stage interaction 
effects on rate of automatization were not reliable. The F-statistic for Group X Stimulus 
interaction effect was F(l, 84) = 0.09, MSE = 0.27. The F-statistic for Group X Stage 
interaction effect, F(2,168) = 0.34, MSE = 0.26. The F-statistic for Group X Stimulus X 
Stage interaction effect, F(2, 168) = 1.53, MSE = 0.28. 
The mean rates of automatization of the two groups for number and word stimuli are 
shovm in Table 25 and plotted in Figure 21. The mean rates of automatization of the two 
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Table 25 
Rates of Automatization of the Gifted and College Groups for Number and Object Stimuli 
Stimulus Group 
Gifted College 
M SE M SE 
Number 0.50 0.05 0.55 0.05 
Object 036 004 039 0.04 
0.6 T 
• Number 
•object 
Gined College 
Group 
Figure 21. Rates of automatization of the gifted and college groups for number and object 
stimuli 
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groups for the training, reversed, and new stages are shown in Table 26 and plotted in Figure 
22. The mean rates of automatization of the two groups for the different stimulus-stage 
combinations are shown in Table 27 and plotted in Figure 23. 
The absence of reliable Group X Stimulus, Group X Stage, and Group X Stimulus X 
Stage interaction effects implies parallel performance profiles, with respect to rates of 
automatization, for the gifted and college groups across different stages and different stimuli. 
Such parallel performance profiles are evident in Figures 21,22, and 23, except that for the 
college group, there appeared to be an increase in the rate of automatization during the sMft 
from the training to reversed stage in word stimuli that was not as apparent for the gifted 
group. (See Figure 23.) 
Discussion 
Instance-based Versus Process-based Transfer 
Process-based transfer is different fi"om instance-based transfer. The mechanism 
responsible for instance-based transfer is the retrieval during transfer of the traces that 
accumulated in memory during training. For retrieval to occur, the transfer stimuli must be 
similar in some way to the training stimuli. The retrieval of traces could not be the mechanism 
responsible for process-based transfer because the transfer stimuli in process-based transfer 
are novel; they had never appeared in training. The mechanism responsible for process-based 
transfer must be an increase in efficiency, achieved through training, in the way with which the 
algorithm could be carried out. 
The results of the alphabet-arithmetic experiment (Experiment 1) indicated that 
process-based transfer could be as successful as instance-based transfer, at least in the gifted 
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Table 26 
Rates of Automatization of the Gifted and College Groups for Training, Reversed, and 
New Stages 
Stage 
Training 
Reversed 
New 
Gifted 
Group 
M S£ 
0.37 
0.43 
0.49 
0.05 
0.06 
0.06 
College 
M SE 
0.37 
0.52 
0.52 
0.05 
0.06 
0.06 
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Figure 22. Rates of automatization of the gifted and college groups for training, reversed, 
and new stages 
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Table 27 
Rates of Automatization of the Gifted and College Groups for the Different Stimulus-
Stage Combinations 
Stimulus Stage 
Gifted 
Group 
M SE 
College 
M SE 
Number 
Object 
Training 
Reversed 
New 
0.48 
0.62 
0.39 
0.09 
0.10 
0.07 
0.49 
0.62 
0.53 
0.08 
0.09 
0.09 
Training 
Reversed 
New 
0.25 
0.24 
0.59 
0.05 
0.05 
0.10 
0.24 
0.41 
0.50 
0.07 
0.09 
0.08 
m A  
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Figure 23. Rates of Automatization of the Gifted and College Groups for the Different 
Stimulus-Stage Combinations 
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and college groups. It was thought that because the types of transfer included in Experiment 
1 were relatively difficult, and because a counting algorithm is not typically associated with 
the alphabet, process-based transfer was not facilitated as it could have been. Thus, it was 
hypothesized that if an algorithm were more closely associated with the task stimuli, then the 
repeated presentation of stimuli during training could more easily facilitate process-based 
transfer. In Experiment 2, a task was used wherein the algorithm (magnitude comparison) is 
more closely associated with the task stimuli (numbers and objects) than the counting 
algorithm is with the alphabet. 
Because magnitude algorithm is more closely associated with numbers than with 
objects, it was then hypothesized in Experiment 2 that there would be greater facilitation of 
process-based transfer with numbers than with objects. That is, with numbers, the repeated 
presentation of stimuli during training could facilitate not only instance-based transfer but 
process-based transfer as well. With objects, on the other hand, process-based transfer would 
not be as successful as instance-based transfer. 
In Experiment 2, it was assumed that the shift from the training to the reversed stage 
exemplified instance-based transfer, and that the shift from the reversed to the new stage 
exemplified process-based transfer. Instance-based transfer was considered as successfiil as 
long as performance (in terms of accuracy, response time, and the parameter c of the power 
law) did not deteriorate during the shift from the training to the reversed stage. Likewise, 
process-based transfer was considered as successfiji as long as performance did not 
deteriorate during the shift from the reversed to the new stage. 
l i s  
Although the analysis looked at three dependent measures (accuracy, response time, 
and the parameter c of the power law), it should be emphasized that the parameter c of the 
power law was the measure of primary interest. The parameter c of the power law indicates 
how drastically or how slowly response times decrease throughout training (See Figure 11). 
Thus, this parameter defines how fast the process of automatization takes place; this 
uiformation is not conveyed in either accuracy scores or response times. Moreover, the 
parameter c is possibly not influenced by other performance factors, such as fatigue, 
concentration, and motivation (Logan, 1988b), as are accuracy scores and response times. 
Contrary to what was predicted, the results of Experiment 2 indicates that with 
numbers, process-based transfer was less successful than instance-based transfer; rate of 
automatization increased during instance-based transfer (i.e., during the shift from the training 
to the reversed stage), but it decreased during process-based transfer (i.e., during the shift 
from the reversed to the new stage). With objects, on the other hand, process-based transfer 
was more successful than instance-based transfer; rate of automatization did not change 
during instance-based transfer (i.e., during the shift from the training to the reversed stage), 
but it increased during process-based transfer (i.e., during the shift fi-om the reversed to the 
new stage). 
It must be noted, however, that in the number-comparison task, although rate of 
automatization decreased during process-based transfer, accuracy scores did not change and 
response times even got faster. In the object-comparison task, although rate of 
automatization increased during process-based transfer, accuracy scores decreased and 
response times did not get any faster. Thus, although process-based transfer was successful 
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with objects in that it was accompanied by an increase in the rate of automatization, this 
increase may have occurred at the expense of accuracy and response time. 
Disregarding, however, the lack of improvement in accuracy and response-time 
performance during process-based transfer with objects, it can be concluded that process-
based transfer was more successful than instance-based transfer in the object-comparison task. 
This result provides support for the hypothesis that if an algorithm is closely associated with 
the task stimuli (as magnitude comparison is closely associated with objects) then the repeated 
presentation of stimuli during training can easily facilitate process-based transfer; if an 
algorithm is not closely associated with the task stimuli (as counting is not closely associated 
with the alphabet), then the repeated presentation of stimuli during training cannot easily 
facilitate process-based transfer. However, the fact that process-based transfer occurred with 
objects but not with numbers does not provide support for this hypothesis considering that 
magnitude comparison is less closely associated with objects than vdth numbers. A possible 
explanation for the absence of process-based transfer with numbers is that number comparison 
is a highly automatized skill for most adults, whereas object comparison is not. It was in fact 
shown in Experiment 2 that the rate of automatization in the number-comparison task was 
consistently higher than in the object-comparison task. Moreover, performance in the 
number-comparison task was more accurate and faster than in the object-comparison task. It 
is possible that process-based transfer was exhibited with objects but not with numbers, 
because there was more "room for improvement" in automatization performance with objects 
than with numbers. 
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Thus, the results of the current research suggest that with algorithms that are not 
closely associated with the task stimuli (as counting is noi closely associated i^dth the 
alphabet), it is not easy to achieve success in process-based transfer. With algorithms, 
however, that are too closely associated with the task stimuli (as magnitude comparison is too 
closely associated with the task stimuli), success in process-based transfer can not be clearly 
exhibited. It is when there is a moderate degree of association between an algorithm and the 
task stimuli that success in process-based transfer can be easily achieved and clearly exhibited. 
Ability Differences Between the Gifted and College Groups 
A secondary objective of Experiment 2 was to determine whether gifted youth were 
precocious or whether ability differences existed between the gifted and college groups. 
Results of Experiment 2 do not suggest any ability differences between the gifted and college 
groups in terms of response time and rate of automatization. The college group's responses 
were no faster nor more quickly automatized than were the gifted group's responses. 
Moreover, no interactions involving group were reliable. This suggests that the performance 
profiles of the gifted group across number and object stimuli, as well as across instance-based 
and process-based transfer, were comparable to the performance profiles of the college group. 
Thus, performance of gifted youth was precocious. 
There were, however, ability diflferences between the gifted and the college groups in 
terms of accuracy. The gifted group's responses were less accurate than the college group's 
responses. Moreover, the Group X Stimulus and Groups X Stage interaction effects on 
accuracy were reliable, suggesting that the performance profiles of the gifted group across 
number and object stimuli, as well as across instance-based and process-based transfer, were 
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dififerent from the performance profiles of the college group. The general pattern in these 
differences was: where accuracy decreased under a change of stimulus (from number to 
word), or under a change of type of transfer (from instance-based to process-based), the 
decrease in accuracy was larger in the gifted group than it was in the college group. 
This general pattern of accuracy differences may be a result of age differences; it may 
be that the gifted group simply had not yet attained the adult level of performance as they had 
with response-time and slope performance. If this were the case, then if average-ability 
seventh and eighth graders were to perform the number- and word-comparison tasks, they 
would exhibit accuracy patterns similar to those for gifted seventh and eighth graders. This 
general pattern of results, however, may be also a result of strategy differences between the 
gifted and college groups. The fact that the gifted and college groups did not differ on 
response time but did differ on accuracy suggests that the gifted group may have been 
emphasizing speed over accuracy to a higher degree than did the college group. 
The results of Experiment 2 regarding group differences are, in general, consistent 
with the results of Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, it was concluded that the gifted and 
college groups were comparable in the ability for automatization. The same conclusion was 
reached in Experiment 2. In both Experiments 1 and 2, the ability to respond to novelty was 
indicated by the ability to maintain or improve training performance during transfer to novel 
stimuli. In Experiment 1, it was concluded that the gifted and college groups were 
comparable in the ability to respond to novelty. Except for the quantitative differences in 
accuracy between the gifted and college groups, the same conclusion can be reached in 
Experiment 2. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Intellectual Giftedness as Intellectual Precocity 
The current research has replicated the two research findings that have been cited in 
the cognitive literature in support of the claim that differences between gifted and average-
ability individuals are quantitative in nature (See Dark & Benbow, 1993): First, thinking 
processes of gifled youth are typical of individuals several years older than they are. Second, 
thinking processes of gifted individuals result in faster and more accurate performance than 
those of average-ability individuals. In addition to these two pieces of evidence, the current 
research has presented a third piece of evidence in support of the quantitative-differences 
hypothesis; When the performance of gifted youth, same-age average-ability individuals, and 
older individuals was examined under conditions that would allow qualitative differences to be 
exhibited, no such qualitative differences were found. 
The fact that ability differences between gifted and average-ability individuals are 
quantitative and not qualitative in nature suggests that when models of human memory are 
constructed to account for the mechanisms behind thinking processes, it is not necessary to 
construct separate models for gifted individuals and for average-ability individuals because 
they do not exhibit qualitatively different thinking processes. Note that this conclusion is 
consistent with the conclusion that can be derived from studies using a psychometric 
approach. In their review of cognitive differences among the gifted. Dark and Benbow (1993) 
noted that the factor structures of intelligence (See Verster, 1987) that were constructed to 
account for differences in aptitude and achievement test scores in a general population can 
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also be used to explain differences in a more restricted gifted population (Benbow et al., 
1983). 
The fact that models of human memory, as well as factor structures of intelligence, can 
apply equally to gifted and average-ability individuals, does not mean that these two groups of 
individuals do not exhibit ability differences. As the results of the current research suggest, 
there are ability differences between gifted and average-ability individuals of the same age. 
These differences, however, are quantitative; gifted individuals are simply more able. 
The evidence in support of the quantitative-differences hypothesis in turn provides 
support for the notion that intellectual giftedness is intellectual precocity (Stanley & Benbow, 
1986). Intellectual giftedness regarded as intellectually precocity means that individuals are 
intellectually gifted because they are intellectually developmentally advanced. Intellectually 
gifted individuals go through a similar progression of intellectual development as do average-
ability individuals, but they do so at a much faster rate. Because of their faster progression 
through the various developmental stages, intellectually gifted youth are able to perform tasks 
much like adults do. 
Automatization and Response to Novelty 
Sternberg's (1985a) triarchic theory of intelligence proposes that the abilities to 
automatize thinking processes and to think through novel problems are integral components of 
intelligence. If these abilities are, indeed, components of intelligence, then it is through these 
abilities that gifted individuals can be differentiated from average-ability individuals. 
The current research provides only partial support for this claim. When measures of 
performance were examined in Experiment 1, it was found that gifted youth were better able 
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to respond to novelty than were average-ability youth; the gifted youth, however, were 
comparable to average-ability youth in their ability for automatization. More specifically, the 
gifted youth had more accurate and faster responses not only during training but also during 
the different types of transfer. The rate of automatization of the gifted youth, however, was 
not any faster than was the rate of automatization of the average-ability youth; this was true 
for training as well as for the different types of transfer. In Experiment 2, except for some 
dififerences in accuracy scores, there were no differences in performance between gifted youth 
and college students. 
The above results suggest that it is not in the process of automatization, as suggested 
by Sternberg's triarchic theory, but in the end product of automatization (i.e., the accumulated 
traces in memory), that ability differences arise between gifted and average-ability individuals. 
Gifted individuals, same-age average-ability individuals, and older individuals are comparably 
fast in going through the process of automatization. When memory retrieval, however, is 
used to respond to novel stimuli, the performance levels of gifted individuals were higher than 
those of same-age average-ability individuals and comparable to those of older individuals. 
Thus, the ability for automatization characterizes intellectual giftedness only in way of its 
relation to the ability to respond to novelty. 
The above conclusion is consistent with the assumptions made by Logan (1988b, 
1992) regarding automatization. As mentioned in the introduction, the instance theory of 
automaticity (Logan, 1988b, 1992) assumes that whenever an information-processing system 
attends to a stimulus in the environment, it always encodes a trace of the stimulus in working 
memory. The theory also assumes that whenever an information-processing system attends to 
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a stimulus in the environment, it always retrieves from long-term memory into working 
memory those traces that are similar to or associated with the environmental stimulus. 
Because automatization occurs with the accumulation of traces in memory and because 
encoding and retrieval always occur upon the presentation of a stimulus, then the instance 
theory would not predict that gifted individuals differ from average-ability individuals in the 
ability for automatization. Logan, however, further assumes that although encoding ^d 
retrieval always occur, the traces of a stimulus that are encoded and retrieved may not include 
all the information there is about the stimulus. The fact that encoding and retrieval, although 
they always occur, may be imperfect may explain why gifted and average-ability individuals 
differ in the ability to respond to novelty. Gifted individuals may be better able than average-
ability individuals to respond to novelty, because gifted individuals can encode and retrieve 
traces of stimuli much more accurately than can average-ability individuals. Thus, again, it is 
not in the process of automatization (because automatization always occurs with encoding and 
retrieval), but in the end product of automatization (i.e., the goodness of traces that are 
encoded and retrieved) that ability differences arise between gifted individuals and average-
ability individuals. 
This conclusion is also consistent with the assumption implicitly made by Sternberg 
(1986,1991b) about automatization. Automatization tasks described by Sternberg (1986, 
1991b) involved scanning pairs of letters to determine if each pair contains identical letters, 
scanning a configuration of letters in search of some target letters, and finding the digit 
corresponding to a given symbol based on a previously memorized list of digit-symbol pair. 
As incorporated in the triarchic abilities test, these automatization tasks do not require 
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repeated exposure to a set of stimuli in a multitrial training episode; that is th^ do not require 
repeated encoding of new traces. Rather, these tasks require test-takers to go through a set of 
stimuli only once but under a strict and very short time limit. It appears then that Sternberg's 
automatization tasks tap ah-eady stored traces (i.e, the end product of automatization) rather 
than the process of automatization. The results in the current research showed that the source 
of ability differences is not in the process of automatization but in the end product of 
automatization; it is likely, therefore, that the automatization tasks in the triarchic abilities test 
would differentiate between gifted and average-ability individuals. Because the end product 
of automatization has a bearing on the ability for coping with novelty, however, it is not clear 
whether Sternberg's automatization tasks are measures of the ability for automatization or of 
the ability for coping v«th novelty. 
Memory Retrieval as a Basis of Transfer 
Because transfer involves applying previous learning to new situations, success in 
transfer is constrained by the learner's ability to respond to novelty. As hypothesized in the 
introduction, and as predicted by the instance theory of automaticity, another factor that 
constrains success in transfer is the similarity between the training and transfer stimuli. The 
instance theory of automaticity suggests that transfer, at least in tasks where the objective of 
training is automatization, is not process-based. That is, it is not the case that learners can 
become so efficient in some memory process that they can readily apply this process even to 
transfer stimuli that are markedly different from the training stimuli. Rather, transfer is 
instance-based. That is, when traces that accumulated in memory during training are similar 
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to the transfer stimuli, then automatization achieved at training can be maintained during 
transfer. 
The statement that transfer is not process-based should be qualified. The current 
research suggests that process-based transfer is diflScult to achieve with a single multitrial 
training session. Evidence from other research suggests, however, that some process-based 
transfer can be derived from instance-based transfer. Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991), for 
instance, report that students, after having been lectured on the rules of logic and after having 
been presented with a few examples of how the rules can be applied, would still make 
numerous errors in applying the rules. The effective method of instruction was to have 
students work with numerous situations that embody a variety of patterns on which the rules 
of logic could be applied. Hintzman's (1986) simulations of instance-based memory 
processing also make a similar point. His simulations show how an information-processing 
system could abstract schemata or generalizations from the traces that were presented to it. 
The point to be made is not that process-based transfer is not possible. Rather, the points to 
be made are that instance-based transfer is more easily achieved than process-based transfer 
and that if process-based transfer were to be successful, it would operate through instance-
based transfer; that is, process-based transfer would operate through the accumulation of 
several traces in memory that embody the variety of patterns or situations under which the 
algorithm can be applied. Thus, process-based transfer occurs not directly as a result of an 
increase in efficiency with which an algorithm is carried out, but as a result of the storage of 
traces that contain the steps involved in the algorithm. In a sense, the steps of the algorithm 
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are encoded into the memory structure through the traces of solutions where the algorithm 
was used. 
Implications of the Current Research to the Instance Theory of Automaticity 
The current research provides support for the instance theory of automaticity by 
showing that, indeed, transfer is primarily instance-based rather than process-based. Even 
when the possibility of achieving process-based transfer was increased by using algorithms 
that were closely associated with the transfer stimuli, (magnitude comparison with numbers 
and objects as opposed to counting with letters), process-based transfer was still less 
successful than instance-based transfer. 
The current research also expands upon the instance theory by shoving its applicability 
to individual differences research. In the power law and linear regression fits performed by 
Logan and his colleagues (Compton & Logan, 1991; Klapp, Boches, Travert, & Logan, 1991; 
Logan, 1988b; Logan & Klapp, 1991), response-time data were collapsed over the entire 
group of participants and values for the parameter c and for the slope were obtained for these 
group data. In the current research, however, values for the parameter c and for the slope 
was obtained separately for each participant's data. Despite the greater variability in 
individual data as compared to group data, the parameter c of the power law, as well as the 
slope obtained when linearly regressing response times on the digits of equations, proved to 
be useful not only in characterizing instance-based and process-based transfer, but also in 
characterizing ability differences among different groups of individuals. 
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NOTES 
1. In tables of means, the standard error of each mean is reported. These separate standard 
errors were not used, however, in any statistical test. Instead, a pooled estimate of 
variance was used in both ANOVAs and LSDs. 
2. Pairwise comparisons of means that were used to describe an interaction effect do not 
constitute an orthogonal set of contrasts having sums of squares that total to the sum of 
squares for the interaction effect. Thus, these comparisons may not provide a 
statistically adequate interpretation of the interaction effect. These comparisons, 
however, can better capture the theoretical implications of the results than can an 
orthogonal set of contrasts. 
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